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THE SUPREME COURT GOES DORMANT WHEN
DESPERATE TIMES CALL FOR DESPERATE
MEASURES: LOOKING TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION FOR A
LESSON IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Erin A. Walter
INTRODUCTION
The United States leads the world in protecting democracy, protect-
ing human rights, and protecting industry and free trade, but it has
fallen behind in the race to protect the environment.1 At the same
time, it has not fallen behind in waste production. The United States
continues to lead the world in waste, generating 275 million tons of
"hazardous waste" and 200 million tons of household waste per year.3
And waste generation is only expected to increase. The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (the "EPA") estimates that Americans will be
generating 216 million tons of garbage by the year 2000.' As landfill
1. See United States Ambassador Defends U.S. Position as Global Leader on En-
vironment Issues, 12/20/95 Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) doc. 3 (Dec. 20, 1995), available in
Westlaw, BNA-IED database (noting suggestions that "while the United States has
shown exemplary leadership on issues such as the strife in Bosnia, the Middle East,
and Northern Ireland, it has fallen behind on environment issues"). According to
Stuart Eizenstadt, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, however, the United
States "feel[s] that environment is one of the most important issues in the U.S., and [it
does] not feel [it has] relinquished a leadership role." Id.
2. Waste Export Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 2525 Before Subcom. on Human
Rights and International Organizations and the Subcom. on International Economic
Policy and Trade of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1989)
(statement of Scott A. Hojost, Acting Associate Administrator for International Af-
fairs); Multimedia Regulation: Impact of EPA's Regulatory Shift on Research Under-
scored at HERL CONFAB, 1994 Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 216, dec. 10 (Nov. 10,
1994), available in Westlaw, BNA-DEN database (statement by Barry Johnson, Assis-
tant Administrator of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry). The
term hazardous waste as defined by the EPA, 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-261.24 (1996),
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994)) [hereinafter
RCRA], is a misnomer. Waste not covered by the definition, such as household
waste, contains toxic substances that seriously threaten the environment and human
beings.
3. Noel Grove, Recycling, Nat'l Geographic, July 1994, at 92, 98; see also OECD
Says U.S. Should Scrutinize Consumption, Cut Unsound Subsidies, 1215195 Int'l Env't
Daily (BNA) doc. 3 (Dec. 5,1995), available in Westlaw, BNA-IED database [herein-
after U.S. Should Scrutinize Consumption] ("The United States still records the larg-
est per capita generation of municipal waste in the OECD." (quoting the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) environmen-
tal assessment of the United States)).
4. Don Phillips, Garbage on the Rails: Out of Sight Out of Mind; Containers
Mask Cargo as Trains Roll Past D.C., Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1991, at Al; see also U.S.
Should Scrutinize Consumption, supra note 3 (stating that the per-person garbage vol-




space becomes scarce and other methods of disposal are found to be
inadequate, the country faces a disposal crisis.
In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act ("RCRA")6 because "the problems of waste disposal... [had]
become a matter national in scope and in concern."'7 RCRA created a
comprehensive, "cradle to grave," regulatory program for hazardous
wastes but left the management of "solid waste" to the states." Since
then, the United States has built an industry out of the management
and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous waste, and has fostered
a booming national and international market in a useless9 product.
The very thing that makes waste disposal so lucrative, however, also
exacerbates the disposal crisis: "[W]hile many are willing to generate
waste,... few are willing to help dispose of it."'" Instead of reducing
consumption or finding an effective waste-management plan to deal
with mounting piles of trash and industrial waste, people have simply
paid someone to take it away.
As a nation, we generate "enough [garbage in one year] to fill a
convoy of garbage trucks stretching eight times around the globe,""
and those trucks are on the move. More than fifteen million tons of
garbage cross state lines each year;' 2 approximately 375,000 tons of
hazardous waste move in interstate commerce each year;' 3 an esti-
mated 2.2 million tons of hazardous waste cross international borders
every year,14 and these numbers are conservative. As long as people
5. See generally Anne Ziebarth, Environmental Law: Solid Waste Transport and
Disposal Across State Lines - The Commerce Clause Versus the Garbage Crisis, 1990
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 365 (1990) (discussing the waste disposal crisis created by vanish-
ing landfill space and by Commerce Clause restrictions on state waste management
efforts).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994)).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1994).
8. Ia (stating that "the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to
be primarily the function of the State, regional, and local agencies").
9. The term useless does not include waste destined for reuse through recycling
or as a raw material.
10. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353, 369 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682 (1994) ("[W]hat makes garbage a profita-
ble business is not its own worth but the fact that its possessor must pay to get rid of
it.").
11. Grove, supra note 3, at 98.
12. Ann R. Mesnikoff, Disposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause Barrier:
Keeping Waste at Home, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1220 (1992) (citing Shipping Out the
Trash, 18 Envtl. F. 28 (Sept./Oct. 1991)).
13. More States Are Exporters of Wastes Than Importers, Study of 1987 Data
Finds, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 753 (Oct. 4, 1995). This data is based on the last
comprehensive study on the movement of hazardous waste made in 1987. Thus, the
amount may not reflect today's increased movement of wastes.
14. See Mary Critharis, Third World Nations Are Down in the Dumps: The Expor-
tation of Hazardous Waste, 16 Brook. J. Int'l L. 311, 311 (1990).
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can easily send their waste elsewhere, there is little incentive to reduce
consumption or to find efficient and safe means of disposal.
In the absence of federal regulation, states have made an effort to
protect the environment and its citizens from the serious threats posed
by the accumulation of waste. Maine and New Jersey responded to
the health and safety threats of overburdened landfills by prohibiting
out-of-state waste from being disposed of in their landfills. 15 The
Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey6 struck down
the New Jersey statute as an unconstitutional violation of the Com-
merce Clause, reasoning that it was facially discriminatory and there-
fore per se invalid.17  By closing off a range of state waste
management options, the Philadelphia decision created the need for
Congressional action; Congress did not act.
In 1989, the EPA noted the growing problem of managing the enor-
mous amount of waste not covered by RCRA and created an
"Agenda for Action" that encouraged states to implement waste man-
agement schemes including, in order of desirability, source reduction,
recycling, combustion, and landfilling.' 8 The EPA also declared that
state and local governments should "assume responsibility for the
wastes generated within their jurisdictions."'19 States responded by
enacting comprehensive waste management schemes for waste gener-
ated within their jurisdictions and attempting to reduce waste produc-
tion overall by halting or at least slowing the march of waste across
the nation. Again the Supreme Court thwarted these new attempts at
environmental protection in the name of free trade and market
unity.20
15. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2253 (West 1983); NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 13:1 1-9
to 1-10 (West 1979). The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute against a
Commerce Clause challenge. See Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm. v. Munici-
pal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 348 A-2d 505, 519 (NJ. 1975). The court reasoned that
(1) useless material dangerous to public health was not an article of commerce pro-
tected by the Commerce Clause, id. at 513; and (2) although useful waste was an
article of commerce, the statute advanced legitimate health and environmental inter-
ests through a necessary means and had an insignificant impact on interstate trade. Id.
at 516-18.
16. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
17. Id at 626. The Court did not even discuss the possibility that the means cho-
sen were necessary to effectively advance the legitimate state interests in protecting
the environment and the health and safety of New Jersey's citizens.
18. Office of Solid Waste, United States Environmental Protection Agency, The
Solid Waste Dilemma: An Agenda for Action 16-17 (1989) [hereinafter Agenda for
Action].
19. 53 Fed. Reg. 36,885 (1988).
20. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994);
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl, Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994);
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
Since the Court's last decision on the free movement of waste, federal courts have
continued to invalidate state waste management schemes based on the dormant Com-
merce Clause. See, e.g., National Solid Wastes Management Assoc. v Meyer, 63 F.3d
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The Constitution states that "[tjhe Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce ... among the several States." 21 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to give Congress plenary
power to restrict or advance free trade among the states while prohib-
iting the states from placing any undue burden on interstate trade
without specific congressional authorization.22 These constitutionally
mandated principles of free trade and market unity23 have been a si-
lent but deadly foe for state environmental protection measures. Be-
cause Congress has not been able to mobilize its Commerce power to
remedy the situation, the Supreme Court today remains the final arbi-
ter in the debate over how to balance trade and the environment in
the United States.
With the environmental crisis reaching global proportions, intema-
tional trade groups' have also faced problems in resolving the tension
between the equally important objectives of free trade and environ-
mental protection. 5 These groups not only acknowledge the impor-
tance of environmental objectives but also, unlike the Supreme Court,
acknowledge that measures clearly interfering with the free move-
ment of goods are in certain circumstances appropriate and necessary
652 (7th Cir. 1995) (invalidating under the Commerce Clause a Wisconsin statute
mandating that all generators wishing to dispose of waste in Wisconsin landfills have
and enforce a recycling program in the community of generation), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1351 (1996); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating
under the Commerce Clause a South Dakota referendum voiding state approval of a
large solid waste disposal facility because it did not apply to landfills that dispose of
South Dakota waste).
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
22. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. The restrictive portion of the
Commerce Clause has been dubbed the dormant, silent, or negative Commerce
Clause. Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale LJ.
425, 425 n.1 (1982).
23. But see Eule, supra note 22, at 434 (arguing that the Commerce Clause cannot
establish a constitutional principle of free trade or market unity because it grants
Congress plenary power to restrict trade).
24. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], now the World Trade Organization (WTO);
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107 Stat.
2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; Basel Convention on the Control of the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Mar. 22, 1989,28 I.L.M. 649 [herein-
after Basel Convention]; European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter EFTA].
25. See Douglas J. Caldwell & David A. Wirth, Trade and the Environment: Equi-
librium or Imbalance?, 17 Mich. J. Int'l L. 563, 563-64, 566 (Spring 1996) (book re-
view) (giving examples of GATT, WTO, and Basel Convention disputes over trade
restrictions based on environmental protection). Specifically, the authors mention the
tuna-dolphin dispute within the GATT where certain countries banned imports of
tuna caught without provisions for protecting dolphins, the dispute settled by the
WTO over the United States' treatment of foreign refiners in a regulation enacted to
protect air quality, heated controversy over a recent amendment to the Basel Conven-
tion that would ban exports of hazardous waste to developing countries, and a United
States challenge in the WTO of the European Union's (EU's) ban on meat produced
from animals treated with growth hormones. Id.
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to attaining those objectives. The Basel Convention, for example, se-
verely restricts the international market in hazardous wastes and ad-
vocates the eventual elimination of all hazardous waste exports from
industrial nations. 6 One could argue that the Supreme Court should
follow the world's lead and acknowledge that drastic measures are
necessary to protect the environment.
On the other hand, the states of the United States are not independ-
ent sovereigns in a trade group bound only by public international
law. The United States is a federal system that must operate under
principles of dual sovereignty and constitutional supremacy. The
United States Constitution establishes the principles and rules by
which the people and institutions of the United States are governed.
The Supreme Court is therefore bound to uphold the Constitution and
one could argue that the Commerce Clause mandates the Court's
conclusions.
Operating under a federal system with a constitution that permits
constituent states to restrict free trade only in narrow circumstances,
however, is not enough to require or justify the Supreme Court's ac-
tions. First, the Commerce Clause at most requires that the state
choose the means least restrictive of free trade, yet still adequate to
protect the environment?27 The desperate nature of the disposal crisis
and the risks to health and resources inherent in the accumulation of
waste require desperate measures to protect the Earth and its inhabit-
ants. Instead of rigidly and improperly applying its dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis to strike down any state's attempt to restrict the
flow of waste, the Court should recognize those measures as constitu-
tionally valid.
Second, when faced with the same issue in its own federal system,
the European Court of Justice reached a very different conclusion.
The European Union, with its system of dual sovereignty and Treaty
26. The United Nations Environmental Programme ("UNEP") established the
Basel Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste with the goals ot (1) encouraging countries to introduce measures designed to
significantly reduce the generation of wastes and ultimately, eliminate their move-
ment; (2) reducing transboundary movement of waste by making approval of move-
ment difficult; (3) confining movement of waste to situations where it is
environmentally sound to dispose of it somewhere other than a place close its source;
and (4) controlling international trade in wastes. See Valentina 0. Okaru, The Basel
Convention: Controlling the Movement of Hazardous Wastes to Developing Countries,
4 Fordham Envtl. L. Rep. 137, 142-43 (Spring 1993); see also Janey Cohen, Conference
Participants Debate Trade Aspects of Basel Convention, 19 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 50
(Jan. 24, 1996) (discussing the trade implications of restricting transfrontier movement
of waste). A recent amendment that completely bans exports of hazardous wastes to
developing countries, however, has incited much controversy. Ban on Waste Exports
Outside OECD Pushed Through Basel Treaty Meeting, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 753
(Oct. 4, 1995). The United States has signed, but has yet to ratify the convention. See
Cohen, supra, at 51.
27. See infra text accompanying note 315.
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supremacy, is very similar in structure to the United States28 and has
often looked to the United States when formulating basic principles of
government and when dealing with the conflicts that arise in a federal
system. Narrowing the focus of comparison to the conflict between
market unity or free trade and environmental protection, the similar-
ity becomes striking. The European Union was founded to unify the
European market and as such, its constitutional charter expressly pro-
tects the free movement of goods among the Member States from un-
due restriction.29 In the face of the environmental crisis, the Member
States of the European Union have enacted measures that threaten
free trade and the unified market. Because the European Union's
legislative bodies have not preempted the regulation of nonhazardous
waste,3" the EC Treaty is the only true limit on the Member States'
power to restrict the movement of nonhazardous waste. Finally, the
European Court of Justice is the final arbiter of constitutional ques-
tions and has developed a doctrine to deal with the validity of Mem-
ber State measures that interfere with free trade that is remarkably
similar to the Supreme Court's doctrine.3 Yet the Court of Justice
did not sacrifice environmental protection for the principle of free
28. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38
Am. J. Comp. L. 205, 210 (Spring 1990) ("At present, the constitutional character of
the European Community Treaties stands beyond doubt."); infra part I.A.
29. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 30-36, 1992
O.J. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Unlike the
Commerce Clause, the EC Treaty does not grant the Community plenary power to
restrict or advance the free movement of goods nor the power to authorized the
Member States to do so. Both the Community and the Member States are limited to
the restrictions permitted by the treaty. See Case C-51/93, Meyhui NV v. Schott
Zwiesel Glaswerke AG, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3879, 1-3898.
30. The only secondary Community law that addresses the disposal or movement
of nonhazardous wastes has either been held by the European Court of Justice not to
preempt Member State action or clearly allows Member State action. The Court of
Justice held that Council Directive 75/442 EEC on waste disposal, as amended by
Council Directive 91/156 EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 78) 32, did not preempt Member State
action in the area of nonhazardous waste disposal. Case C-2/90, Commission v.
Belgium (Walloon Waste), 1992 E.C.R. 1-4431, 1-4454, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1992).
Council Regulation 259/93 EEC on the supervision and control of shipments of waste
within, into, and out of the European Community, 1993 O.J. (L 30) 1, establishes a
system of notification for transfrontier movement of waste but specifically allows
Member States to "take measures in accordance with the Treaty to prohibit generally
or partially or to object systematically to shipments of waste." Id. at art. 4, § 3(a)(i).
In addition, the directive and the regulation were adopted under EC Treaty Article
130s which is restricted in scope by Article 130t to action that "shall not prevent any
Member States from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures
.... compatible with this Treaty." EC Treaty art. 130t (as in effect in 1993). Article
130t of the Treaty has not been changed by any amendments since 1993. See EC
Treaty art. 130t (as in effect in 1996). Thus the Member States' enactment of environ-
mental measures that restrict trade today remains limited only by the treaty provi-
sions on the free movement of goods.
31. Damien Geradin, Free Trade and Environmental Protection in an Integrated
Market: A Survey of the Case Law of the United States Supreme Court and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, 2 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 141, 191-92 (1993).
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trade; it upheld Member State measures that restricted the flow of
waste for purposes of protecting the environment and its citizens. 3a
This Note argues that the Supreme Court has made an unwise pol-
icy choice not required by its constitutional doctrine. The Note fur-
ther argues that the Court should look to the European Court of
Justice for a lesson in how to balance free trade and environmental
protection in a federal system partially founded on the idea of an inte-
grated market. It is time the teacher became the student. Part I es-
tablishes a foundation for comparing the roles of the Supreme Court
and the European Court of Justice in protecting free trade. Part I
then compares the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence with the European Court of Justice's doctrine on the free
movement of goods and reveals their significant similarities. Part H"
explores the Supreme Court's application of the dormant Commerce
Clause in environmental protection cases, including cases involving
the movement of waste. Part III examines the European Union's en-
vironmental policy, focusing on the proximity and self-sufficiency
principles, and discusses why following those principles allows Statesa3
to attain efficient waste management and the overall reduction of
waste generation. Part IIl also examines the Court of Justice's use of
these principles in determining whether a measure that restricts the
free movement of goods is necessary to protect the environment. Fi-
nally, part IV considers how the Supreme Court has failed to apply its
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence properly in the context of
the movement of waste. The Court has found nondiscriminatory
measures to be discriminatory, has found economic protectionism
where it does not exist, and has either failed to recognize the means
necessary to protect health and the environment or altogether failed
to discuss the propriety of the chosen means. Part IV then applies the
Court of Justice's analysis to each of the measures struck down by the
Supreme Court and finds that four out of five should be upheld as
appropriate and necessary to the protection of the Earth and its in-
habitants. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should recog-
nize state waste management schemes that implement the proximity
and self-sufficiency principles as constitutional restrictions on the free
movement of goods.
32. See Walloon Waste, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-4481. In Walloon Waste, the Court of
Justice noted the Community policies of proximity and self-sufficiency, recognized the
cumulative effects of waste disposal and the consequent disposal crisis, and acknowl-
edged that a total ban of foreign waste could be an appropriate and necessary means
of protecting the environment and guarding human safety. Id. at 1-4478 to 1-4481. For
a detailed discussion of the Walloon Waste case, see infra part III.C.
33. For purposes of this note, the term "State" refers to constituent states of both
the United States and the European Union. "Member State" refers only to the con-




I. COMPARING THE DOCTRINES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
At first glance, the European Union looks like a group of sovereign
nations loosely bound by an international treaty aimed at removing
trade barriers. With further inspection, however, a government of di-
vided powers operating under the rule of law emerges from the dust
of World War II and the European Community Treaties. Because the
United States represents the classic federal system, the United States
experience has been a guiding force in the evolution of the "New Eu-
rope." The consequent similarities make for fruitful comparison.
A. Federalism in the European Union
Federalism has been defined as "a system of divided powers...
proceed[ing] from the very essence of constitutionalism, which is lim-
ited government operating under the rule of law."'34 According to
Koen Lenaerts, a leading scholar in constitutionalism and comparative
law, "Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereignty is guaran-
teed by the national or supranational constitution and umpired by the
supreme court of the common legal order. '35 The United States is
probably the most well-known example of a federal system, and today
clearly fits this description.36 The United States Constitution divides
34. Lenaerts, supra note 28, at 205 (footnote omitted) (citing Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 2 (1988)).
35. Id at 263. Professor Lenaerts is a judge on the Court of First Instance in
Luxembourg. The Court of First Instance hears and determines "certain classes of
action or proceeding," subject to appeal to the Court of Justice. EC Treaty art. 168a.
Professor Lenaert's definition provides minimum requirements for a federal sys-
tem. Professor Roger J. Goebel presents a more specific definition of federalism that
the Member States accept as characterizing the European Union:
A federal system is one in which: 1) a constitution, or other constitutive
document or documents, is, or are, generally recognized to delineate the
powers of a political structure.. .; 2) the constitutive states transfer some of
their sovereignty ... to the central political structure; and 3) the central
structure exercises a substantial degree of legislative or regulatory, executive
or administrative, and judicial or quasi-judicial authority.
Roger J. Goebel, The European Community and Eastern Europe: "Deepening" and
"Widening" the Community Brand of Economic Federalism, 1 New Eur. L. Rev. 163,
167 (1993).
36. In the early days of the United States under the Constitution, principles like
judicial review and implied federal powers that are today well-established were not
universally agreed upon. Justice Marshall established the validity of these principles
under the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding
that the courts have the power of judicial review), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) (holding that the constitution grants the federal govern-
ment implied powers), only after considerable debate. Indeed in McCulloch, when
Maryland argued that the "powers of the general government ... are delegated by the
states, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the
States, who alone possess supreme dominion," id. at 402, Justice Marshall had to "re-




sovereignty between the states and the central government and pro-
vides the rule of law governing the people and their government. The
preamble to the Constitution guarantees its supremacy by confirming
that "the People..., in Order to form a more perfect Union, ... do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America."37 The Supreme Court acts as umpire by interpreting the
rule of law and striking the balance of powers accordingly.
The European Union does not fit as readily into this framework for
a federal system. First, the union was formed by a series of treaties,18
which generally does not operate as a constitution.3 9 Second, the
Treaty does not provide for its supremacy nor its direct application to
the people of the union. The Member States formed the union, not
the people: "By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish
among themselves a European Union."0 Although the preambles to
the TEU and the EC Treaty speak of forming "an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe,"'" the Heads of State are the actors.
These potential deficiencies, however, were rectified by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in its early case law. In the landmark case, van
Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen,42 the Court
of Justice established that the EEC (now EC) Treaty was "more than
an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the
contracting states."43 The court grounded its view in "the preamble to
37. U.S. Const. pmbL
38. The European Union actually rests on a series of treaties. The first three trea-
ties consisted of the Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr.
18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 297 U.N.T.S. 259, and the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]. These treaties have been amended several times, always moving toward a
stronger federal system. The most notable amendments were the Single European
Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.3. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA] and the Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter TEU]. The institutional struc-
ture and system of law rest primarily on the EEC Treaty as amended by the SEA and
Article G of the TEU. Article G of the TEU changes the name of the treaty from the
European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty to the European Community (EC)
Treaty. TEU art. G.
39. The parties to a treaty are generally bound by public international law which
allows for derogation from the treaty if one party fails to act and allows laws enacted
later in time to override the treaty. See George A. Bermann et al, Cases and Materi-
als on European Community Law 204-06 (1993). For an exhaustive discussion of
Member State reception of Community law, see id. at 206-44.
40. TEU art. A.
41. EC Treaty pmbL (emphasis added); TEU pmbl. (emphasis added).
42. Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
43. Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.Rt at 12. Although the European Court of Jus-
tice most often discusses the constitutional nature of the EEC (now EC) Treaty, all of
the treaties in combination form the constitutional charter. The EC Treaty, however,
creates the Community institutions, divides power between the Community and the
Member States, and provides most of the principles under which the system operates.
This Note, therefore, compares the relevant provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion with those of the EC Treaty.
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the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples...
[and] more specifically [in] the establishment of institutions endowed
with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and
also their citizens." 44 The court went on to say that the Treaty, in-
dependent of the Member States,
not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to
confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.
These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the
Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes
in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Mem-
ber States and upon the institutions of the Community.45
Ultimately, the court concluded that the Community "constitutes a
new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states
have limited their sovereign rights. ' 46 In one fell swoop, the Court of
Justice established that the EEC (now EC) Treaty guaranteed a sys-
tem of dual sovereignty and had direct application to the citizens of
the Member States.
Soon after, the Court of Justice reinforced and expanded the consti-
tutional character of the Treaty in Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia
Elettrica.47 In Costa, the court went beyond the notion of dual sover-
eignty and direct treaty application and announced the principle of
Treaty supremacy:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own in-
stitutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of
representation on the international plane and, more particularly,
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer
of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States
have limited their sovereign rights.., and have thus created a body
of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.48
44. Id.
45. Id
46. Id. In later cases where the court discusses the "new legal order" of the trea-
ties, it does not use the language "of international law," but rather refers to a new
"legal system." See Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R.
585, 593, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425 ("By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the
EEC Treaty has created its own legal system .... "); see also Case 294/83, Parti dcolo-
giste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1366, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R.
343 (speaking of "the spirit of the Treaty... and... its system").
47. Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
48. Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 593. The court found this principle in Article 5 of the
EEC (now EC) Treaty which states:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or par-
ticular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment
of the objectives of this Treaty.
EC Treaty art. 5. The court held that this mandate applied to the Member State
courts and as a result those courts could not uphold a national law in conflict with the
Treaty or secondary Community law. Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 593-94, 599-600.
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In the ensuing decades, the Court of Justice continued to interpret the
Treaties as a constitution and after some resistance, the Member
States have accepted the interpretation.49
The final step toward federalism is the existence of a judicial umpire
with the power to interpret the constitution and thus preserve the bal-
ance of powers both between the central government and its constitu-
ent entities and between the institutions of the general government if
they are separate.s0 The European Court of Justice has clearly taken
on this role. In Parti gcologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament, '
the Court of Justice confirmed its power of judicial review over the
actions of the Community and the Member States: "[T]he [EC] is a
Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether
the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic consti-
tutional charter, the Treaty."'
Today, "the constitutional character of the European Community
Treaties stands beyond doubt. '5 3 The federal nature of the European
Union's system of government should also stand beyond doubt even
though the European Union refuses to use the term federal to de-
scribe itself.54 The Treaties form a constitution that permanently
guarantees dual sovereignty between the Member States and the cen-
tral institutions of the Community (the Council, the Commission, the
Parliament, and the Court of Justice); the central institutions have the
power to enact laws and to administer and judge those laws; the
Treaty and laws pursuant to the Treaty are supreme and may preempt
national law; and the European Court of Justice has the power to re-
view both Community and national law to determine its validity uinder
the Treaty. The European Court of Justice itself best summarizes the
federal characteristics of the European Union:
[T]he EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international
agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a
49. See Bermann, supra note 39, at 206; Goebel, supra note 35, at 172.
50. The European Court of Justice has interpreted the Treaties to include the prin-
ciples of both horizontal (intra-institutional) and vertical (Community-Member State)
separation of powers. Lenaerts, supra note 28, at 208-09.
51. Case 294/83, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, [1987] 2 C.M.LR. 343 (1986).
52. "Les Verts", 1986 E.C.R. at 1365. EC Treaty Article 173 states that "[tihe
Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts [of the Community institutions]." EC
Treaty Article 177 states that where a question on "the interpretation of this Treaty
... [or] acts of the institutions of the Community" is raised, the Member State court
or tribunal of last resort "shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice."
53. Lenaerts, supra note 28, at 210; see also Trevor C. Hartley, Federalism, Courts
and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution of the European Community, 34 Am.
J. Comp. L. 229,231 (1986) ("The Constitution of the Community takes the form of a
series of international treaties."); Eric Stein, Treaty-Based Federalism, A.D. 1979: A
Gloss on Covey T. Oliver at the Hague Academy, 127 U. Pa. L Rev. 897, 900-05
(1979) (discussing the constitutional nature of certain treaties).
54. See Goebel, supra note 35, at 166, 168-69 (describing the fear of the word fed-
eral because today it connotes a particularly strong central government).
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Community based on the rule of law. The Community treaties es-
tablished a new legal order for the benefit of which the States have
limited their sovereign rights and the subjects of which comprise not
only Member States but also their nationals. The essential charac-
teristics of the Community legal order which has thus been estab-
lished are in particular its primacy over the law of the Member
States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions.55
The Court of Justice's role in the European Union's federal system of
government is that of interpreter of the constitution and umpire be-
tween the Member States and the Community institutions and is thus
comparable to the Supreme Court's role in the United States
Government.
B. Constitutional Protection of Free Trade Among the
Several States
Before the Constitution, the American States were independent
sovereigns bound only by the Articles of Confederation, which pro-
vided a weak central body that lacked legislative power and dealt only
with military and foreign affairs.5 6 At first, the states banded together
out of necessity to secure their collective independence. The Treaty of
Paris in 1783, however, officially ended the need for wartime coopera-
tion and left each state to pursue its own economic and political inter-
ests.57 Each state began to legislate "according to its.., own interests,
the importance of its own products, and the local advantages or disad-
vantages of its position in a political or commercial view."58 The time
was marked by commercial warfare between the states. This situation
so threatened the union that it is almost uniformly thought to be the
primary reason for the Constitutional Convention.59
55. Opinion delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of
the Treaty (European Economic Area Opinion), Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, 1-
6080-81, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 245 (1991).
56. Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History 65 (1989). The
Articles of Confederation stated that "each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confeder-
ation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." Stone et al.,
Constitutional Law Second Edition 2 (1991) (quoting the Articles of Confederation).
57. See Hall, supra note 56, at 65.
58. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (quoting 1 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 259, at 240 (1833)).
59. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (citing the central
concern over the economic balkanization that "had plagued relations among the Col-
onies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation" as an "immedi-
ate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention"); H.P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 533
("The sole purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately pro-
duced the Constitution was 'to take into consideration the trade of the United States
... ."'); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (asserting that the states'
having power over commerce resulted in self-serving actions that threatened the
union and led to the constitutional convention). Justice Johnson, in a concurring
opinion in Gibbons, remarked:
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Similarly, before the EC Treaty, the nations of Europe were in-
dependent sovereigns pursuing their own economic and political inter-
ests. After World War II, however, Europe fell into a state of
economic and political turmoil.6' Extensive destruction of capital
stock, damage to transport capital, neglect of research and develop-
ment, and finally, the loss of twenty million people left Europe at a
great disadvantage economically.61 Furthermore, the Cold War, the
partition of Europe, and the decolonization of Africa, the Caribbean,
and Asia disrupted or destroyed markets and created political un-
rest.' These circumstances led to a desire for the strength that Euro-
pean unity and particularly economic integration could provide,63 and
prompted the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community
and then a more comprehensive plan seeking "common action to
eliminate the barriers which divide Europe."'
The United States under the Constitution and the European Com-
munity (now European Union) under the EC Treaty were founded on
a desire to break down barriers between constituent members and to
create a unified market. The principles of free trade among the States
and economic unity are therefore fundamental to the existence of the
United States and the European Union.6 As such, the constitutional
charters of both systems prohibit States from unduly restricting free
[F]inding themselves in the unlimited possession of those powers over their
own commerce .... that selfish principle... began to show itself in iniqui-
tous laws and impolitic measures, from which grew up a conflict of commer-
cial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their
commercial interests abroad. This was the immediate cause that led to the
forming of the convention.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 224 (Johnson, J., concurring).
60. Bermann, supra note 39, at 3; Allan M. Williams, The European Community:
The Contradictions of Integration 14 (1991).
61. Williams, supra note 60, at 14-15.
62. Id at 16.
63. kd at 18-21.
64. Bermann, supra note 39, at 5, 8 (quoting EEC Treaty pmbl.); Williams, supra
note 60, at 21-29.
65. See Case 240/83, Procureur de la Rdpublique v. Association de dafense des
br0leurs d'huiles usag~es (Waste Oils), 1985 E.C.Rt 531, 548, [1983-1985 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) '1 14,164 (1985) (noting that "the principles of
free movement of goods and freedom of competition, together with freedom of trade
as a fundamental right, are general principles of Community law."); Lnfra Part I.C.1
(describing the Supreme Court's enunciation of a constitutional principle of free
trade). But see Eule, supra note 22, at 434 (arguing that Congress' plenary power
under the Commerce Clause to restrict free trade among the states implies that free
trade and a national market cannot be fundamental constitutional values). Unlike the
United States Constitution, the EC Treaty expressly protects free trade from undue
interference by constituent states or by the central government. Case C-51/93, Meyhui
NV v. Schott Zwiesel Glaswerke AG, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3879, 1-3898 ("It is settled law
that the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and of all measures having equivalent
effect applies not only to national measures but also to measures adopted by the
Community institutions."). Under Eule's analysis then, the principles of free trade




trade and, more specifically to this Note, the free movement of goods:
the United States Constitution does so in the negative implications of
the Commerce Clause;66 the EC Treaty does so in Article 30's and
Article 34's express prohibitions against quantitative restrictions on
the free movement of goods.67
C. Constitutional Limits on Restrictive State Measures
Although the free movement of goods may be considered a funda-
mental objective in the United States and the European Union,
neither the Constitution nor the EC Treaty make it immune from re-
striction by the constituent States. The extent to which the Constitu-
tion and the EC Treaty limit the ability of states and Member States,
respectively, to enact measures that restrict the free movement of
goods is an inquiry left to the final arbiters of constitutional questions,
the supreme courts of the central legal orders.
1. The Supreme Court's Review of Restrictive State Measures
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
The Constitution does not expressly protect free trade nor articu-
late any free market ideal for the United States. This lack of explicit
protection has been called one of the "great silences of the Constitu-
tion."'68 The Supreme Court, however, "has advanced the solidarity
and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to [that]
silence[ ]. ''69 In the few words of the Commerce Clause,70 the
Supreme Court has found not only a positive grant of power to Con-
gress, but also an implied prohibition against state interference with
interstate commerce.7' This negative implication has been dubbed the
"dormant," "negative," or "silent" Commerce Clause72  and is
66. See infra part I.C.1.
67. Article 30 states: "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures hay-
ing equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited
between Member States." EC Treaty art. 30. Article 34 states: "Quantitative restric-
tions on exports, and all measures having equivalent effect, shall be prohibited be-
tween Member States." EC Treaty art. 34. For an explanation of the meaning given
these words by the European Court of Justice, see infra part I.C.2.
68. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
69. Id
70. "The Congress shall have the Power To... regulate Commerce ... among the
several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-3.
71. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) ("It is long established
that, while a literal reading evinces a grant of power to Congress, the Commerce
Clause also directly limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate
commerce."); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) ("Although the Clause thus
speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the Court long has recognized
that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade."
(quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980))).
72. Eule, supra note 22, at 425 n.1. The word dormant, although it is the least
appropriate, is the most commonly used term to describe this prohibitive aspect of the
Commerce Clause. Id This note adopts the common usage.
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grounded in the framers' intent to end the balkanization of the states
under the Articles of Confederation.73
This Commerce Clause interpretation has led to much conflict with
state legislation because the clause's limitation on state regulatory
power "is by no means absolute"'74 yet the clause "does not say what
the states may or may not do in the absence of congressional ac-
tion. '75 The Supremacy Clause clearly provides for federal preemp-
tion of a state measure when the state measure conflicts with a federal
statute.76 Alternatively, Congress may give states the power to re-
strict interstate commerce in a manner that would otherwise violate
the Commerce Clause as long as Congress makes its intent to do so
"unmistakably clear." 77  When Congress has been silent, however,
"the States retain authority under their general police powers to regu-
late matters of 'legitimate local concern' even though interstate com-
merce may be affected.178 In this situation, the Court must provide
meaningful interpretation of the limits imposed upon the states by the
dormant Commerce Clause.
Scholars disagree on the proper basis for Supreme Court review of
state measures under the dormant Commerce Clause. The bases most
often advocated are protection of fundamental rights and representa-
tion-reinforcement.79 Still others deny the existence of a dormant
Commerce Clause and argue that the Court has no business making
73. See supra part I.B.
74. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,
36 (1980)).
75. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
76. U.S. Const. art. VI.
77. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. CL 1677, 1691 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Congress must be 'unmistakably clear' before we will
conclude that it intended to permit state regulation which would otherwise violate the
dormant Commerce Clause."); Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 ("It is well established that
Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause
would otherwise forbid.... But... this Court has exempted state statutes from the
implied limitations of the Clause only when the Congressional direction to do so has
been 'unmistakably clear."').
78. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (quoting BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. at 36); see also
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 204 (1824) ("[I]f a State, in passing laws on
subjects acknowledged to be within its control, [i.e. police powers,) ... shall adopt a
measure of the same character as Congress may adopt, it ... denve[s] its authority
from the particular power.., which remains with the State, and may be executed by
the same means.").
79. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 22, at 428 (arguing that the dormant Commerce
Clause is appropriate only as a vehicle to protect the unrepresented interests in a state
and then only as an adjunct to the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Steven G. Gey,
The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 1, 79 (1989-90) (advocating increased use of the dormant Commerce Clause
to protect economic unity); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protec-
tionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091,
1093, 1174-80 (1986) (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause applies only to




the policy choices involved in balancing legitimate state interests with
free trade.80 The Court relies on aspects of each approach to justify its
novel method of balancing the free movement of goods across state
lines with the states' power to protect the environment and the health
and safety of its citizens.8'
The Court uses a two-step approach when dealing with state meas-
ures that affect interstate commerce. The Court first asks whether the
measure is discriminatory. The answer to this question determines the
level of scrutiny to be applied. Discriminatory measures then receive
strict scrutiny whereas evenhanded measures receive a much lower
level of scrutiny in the form of a balancing test between local benefits
and burdens on interstate commerce.
a. Discriminatory Measures
If a state measure is facially discriminatory or discriminatory in
practical effect, the Court applies strict scrutiny and will uphold the
measure only if the state proves that the measure advances a legiti-
mate local interest and no adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives
exist.8' The Court first articulated this test in Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison. 3 In Dean Milk, the city of Madison, Wisconsin enacted an
ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk pasteurized more than five
miles from the central square of Madison, avowedly to protect the
quality of the milk and thus the health, safety and well-being of local
communities.' The Court accepted the concern over the sanitary reg-
ulation of milk and milk products as a legitimate local interest.8 5 The
Court then determined that, although the ordinance was facially neu-
80. See Richard B. Collins, Justice Scalia and the Elusive Idea of Discrimination
Against Interstate Commerce, 20 N.M. L. Rev. 555, 557 (1990) (discussing Justice
Scalia's argument against the dormant Commerce Clause for lack of textual support);
Eule, supra note 22, at 428 (arguing that the better clause for protecting out-of-staters
is the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
81. See, e.g., Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139 ("[A]ny relaxation in the restrictions on state
power... imposed by the Commerce Clause unacceptably increases 'the risk that
unrepresented interests will be adversely affected by restraints on commerce."' (quot-
ing South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984))); H.P. Hood
& Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-35 (1949) (describing free trade as a
constitutional value protected by the Commerce Clause)
82. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (stating that a facially discriminatory measure may be
upheld if it serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by
available nondiscriminatory alternatives (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941,
957 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951))); Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354 (stating for the first
time the standard that measures discriminatory on their face or in practical effect
cannot be upheld "if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve
legitimate local interests, are available"). This test requires that states use the means
least restrictive of interstate commerce yet still effective in achieving a legitimate goal.
83. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
84. Id at 350, 353.
85. Id at 353.
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tral because it applied to milk produced anywhere, "[[i]n... erecting
an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competi-
tion from without the State, Madison plainly discriminate[d] against
interstate commerce."' 6
Having found the measure to be discriminatory in practical effect,
the Court announced the following test: local government cannot en-
act discriminatory measures, "even in the exercise of its unquestioned
power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local in-
terests, are available."' 7  The Court found that adequate
nondiscriminatory alternatives such the inspection and certification
system recommended by the United States Public Health Service (the
"Model Milk Ordinance") did exist.88 The majority relied on the
Madison Health Commissioner's testimony that "consumers 'would
be safeguarded adequately' under either proposal" and on the milk
sanitarian of the Wisconsin State Board of Health's testimony recom-
mending a measure based on the Model Milk Ordinance. s9 The dis-
sent argued that the record was insufficient to determine whether the
alternative solutions suggested by the Court were adequate and as-
serted that "judicial knowledge" could not replace evidence of the
"relative merits of the Madison ordinance and the alternatives sug-
gested by the Court .... ,90 Based on its review of the available evi-
dence, however, the Court held the ordinance unconstitutional. 91
In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,92 the
Court used the same test to strike down another facially neutral yet
discriminatory93 statute prohibiting the display of the Washington
State apple grade on closed containers: 94
When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found is
demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in
terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavail-
ability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the
local interests at stake. North Carolina has failed to sustain that
burden on both scores.95
The Court found that North Carolina's proffered interest of consumer
protection would be legitimate if the North Carolina statute protected
86. Id. at 354.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 354-56.
89. Id. at 355-56.
90. Id at 359-60.
91. Id. at 356.
92. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
93. The statute was again facially neutral but discriminatory in effect because it
raised the cost of doing business in North Carolina for Washington apple growers and
protected North Carolina growers from competition with growers of higher grade ap-
ples. Id at 350-52.
94. Id at 337.
95. Id at 353 (citations omitted).
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the consumer at all. The Court implied that the statute so poorly
served the alleged interest that it could not have been the primary
goal and that economic protectionism was more likely the statute's
goal. The availability of numerous superior, not just adequate, alter-
natives sealed the statute's fate. 96
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,97 the Court created an even
stricter test for measures it considered arbitrarily discriminatory. New
Jersey banned the importation of most solid and liquid waste for the
professed purpose of protecting the environment and the health and
safety of its citizens from the accumulation of waste in its
overburdened landfills.98 The Court never even cited the general rule
to be applied to state laws that discriminate against interstate com-
merce. The critical inquiry, rather, was whether the measure was "ba-
sically a protectionist measure, or whether it [could] fairly be viewed
as a law directed to legitimate local concerns" with only incidental
effects on interstate commerce.99 The Court proceeded to deem irrel-
evant the legislative purpose because "the evil of protectionism can
reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends."' 00 Thus, if the
state did not have a legitimate reason to distinguish between domestic
and foreign goods, the statute amounted to arbitrary discrimination or
"simple economic protectionism" and was subject to a "virtually per
se rule of invalidity.'' 101 Asserting that the harms to be prevented by
New Jersey's statute arose after disposal when out-of-state waste was
indistinguishable from in-state waste,0 2 the Court held that New
Jersey had arbitrarily discriminated against out-of-state waste by ban-
ning out-of-state waste while leaving its landfills open to in-state
waste. 0 3
Aside from distinguishing between the harm caused by out-of-state
and in-state goods, the Court left open one other option to avoid ap-
plication of the per se invalidity rule. The Court admitted that New
Jersey might be able to constitutionally prohibit waste importation
96. Id. at 353-54.
97. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
98. Id. at 625. The statute set out its purpose as follows:
The Legislature finds and determines that... the volume of solid and liquid
waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment and disposal of these
wastes continues to pose an even greater threat to the quality of the environ-
ment of New Jersey, that the available and appropriate land fill sites within
the State are being diminished, that the environment continues to be
threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste which originated or was
collected outside the State, and that the public health, safety and welfare
require that the treatment and disposal within this state of all wastes gener-
ated outside of the State be prohibited.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1I-9 (West 1978).
99. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
100. Id. at 626.
101. Id. at 623-24.
102. Id. at 629.
103. Id at 626-27.
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under the quarantine precedents"°' if "the very movement of waste
into or through New Jersey endangers health, or... [if] waste must be
disposed of as soon and as close to its point of generation as
possible."105
Only one year after Philadelphia, the Court in Hughes v.
Oklahoma'0 6 clearly set forth the Dean Milk "no adequate alterna-
tives" test as the general rule for discriminatory statutes:
Under that general rule, we must inquire (1) whether the challenged
statute regulates evenhandedly ... or discriminates against inter-
state commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether
the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether
alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without
discriminating against interstate commerce.... [Wihen considering
the purpose .... this Court... will determine for itself the practical
impact of the law.107
The Court then applied the test to strike down a facially discrimina-
tory Oklahoma statute that forbade the export for sale of minnows
caught in the state. 08 The Court noted the heightened scrutiny-vir-
tual per se invalidity-announced in Philadelphia'°9 for statutes em-
ploying discriminatory means without a legitimate reason to
distinguish in-state and out-of-state goods, but did not follow this rea-
soning. It did not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state min-
nows; it applied the general rule and found adequate
nondiscriminatory alternatives." 0
Maine v. Taylor"' also applied the general rule to a facially discrim-
inatory statute prohibiting the importation of baitfish into Maine." 2
The Court limited the Philadelphia per se invalidity rule to measures
that amount to "simple economic protectionism" and measures that
104. States had long been able to prohibit the importation of items "which, on ac-
count of their existing condition, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and
death, such as... provisions that are ... unfit for human use or consumption." Bow-
man v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888).
105. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629. The Court here, without knowing it, aptly sum-
marizes the proximity principle, which forms part of the European Community's envi-
ronmental policy and contributed to the European Court of Justice's finding that a
waste import ban was necessary to protect the environment. See infra part MI for a
description of these policies and the Court of Justice's use of the policies in making its
determinations.
106. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
107. Id at 336.
108. Id at 338. Although conservation of resources was a legitimate local purpose,
many effective alternatives existed to serve that interest. Id.
109. Id at 337 ("Such facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect .... "
(citing Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626)).
110. Id at 336-38.
111. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
112. Id at 138.
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"discriminat[e] arbitrarily against interstate trade."' 3 The court then
proceeded to analyze the measure under the general rule because
[n]ot all intentional barriers to interstate trade are protectionist...
and the Commerce Clause "is not a guaranty of the right to import
into a state whatever one may please ... regardless of the effects of
the importation upon the local community." Even overt discrimina-
tion against interstate trade may be justified where, as in this case,
out-of-state goods or services are particularly likely for some reason
to threaten the health and safety of a State's citizens or the integrity
of its natural resources ... 114
The Court distinguished Philadelphia based on Maine's legitimate rea-
sons for treating out-of-state baitfish differently than native baitfish,
namely the parasite commonly found in foreign but not native fish. 115
The Court went on to find Maine's interest in "guarding against im-
perfectly understood environmental risks" 1 6 to be a legitimate local
concern and then thoroughly examined the availability of less discrim-
inatory alternatives. The appellee argued that procedures for inspec-
tion could easily be developed and that farm grown baitfish should be
allowed into Maine because they did not create a significant risk to
native Maine species.1 17 In response to the appellee's first argument,
the Court noted that
the "abstract possibility," of developing acceptable testing proce-
dures, particularly when there is no assurance as to their effective-
ness, does not make those procedures an '[a]vailabl[e] . . .
nondiscriminatory alternative'.... A State must make reasonable
efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its bor-
ders, but it is not required to develop new and unproven means of
protection at an uncertain cost." 8
As to the second argument, the uncertainty of the scientific evidence
led the Court to defer to the Maine legislature's choice to include
farm grown baitfish in the ban." 9 The available nondiscriminatory al-
ternatives could not clearly protect Maine's environment as ade-
113. Id. at 148 & n.19 (citing Philadelphia and Hughes as examples). The Taylor
Court describes laws improperly motivated by the economic protection of local indus-
tries as "economic protectionism" and laws that may be motivated by legitimate con-
cerns but discriminate without distinguishing in-state from out-of-state goods as
"discriminating arbitrarily." Id.
114. Id. at 148 n.19 (quoting Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 458 (1946)).
115. Id. at 148 & n.19, 151-52.
116. Id at 148.
117. Id at 142, 147.
118. Id at 147-48 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The Court also noted
that "'[T]he constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause cannot be read
as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible
environmental damage has occurred or until the scientific community agrees on what
disease organisms are or are not dangerous before it acts to avoid such conse-





quately as the Maine legislature's chosen means; thus, the measure
was a constitutional restriction of the free movement of goods.
Since Taylor, the Supreme Court has heard only four cases on dis-
criminatory measures that restrict the free movement of goods alleg-
edly for purposes other than economic protectionism, and all have
been concerned with the free movement of waste. Although at times
the Court cites the general rule set forth in Dean Milk and suggests
adequate alternatives, it never clearly follows the general rule but in-
stead follows Philadelphia. In applying the Philadelphia analysis, it
adheres to the outcome, never addressing the exceptions therein to
the per se invalidity rule."2 These cases will be discussed in depth in
part II.B and part IV.
b. Evenhanded Measures
Not all local measures are discriminatory. If a measure is an even-
handed attempt to serve a legitimate local interest, the Court applies
much lower scrutiny. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.a "' sets forth the bal-
ancing test used by the Court to assess nondiscriminatory measures:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.... [T]he extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on inter-
state activities.'22
In Pike, an Arizona statute required that Arizona-grown cantaloupes
be packaged in standard containers showing their origin. The purpose
was to enhance the reputation of Arizona cantaloupes, thereby pro-
moting a local industry. The effect was to prohibit cantaloupe growers
from having their fruit packaged outside Arizona. 123 The Court found
the statute nondiscriminatory but found its impact on interstate com-
merce clearly excessive in relation to the local benefit of enhanced
reputation for Arizona cantaloupes.121 "Such an incidental conse-
quence of a regulatory scheme could perhaps be tolerated if a more
compelling state interest were involved." '"s
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co."16 applied the Pike test to a
Minnesota statute prohibiting the sale of milk in nonreturnable,
nonrefillable plastic containers but not other nonreturnable, nonrefil-
120. See supra part II.B.
121. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
122. Id at 142 (citation omitted).
123. Idt at 138, 143.
124. Id. at 146.
125. Id
126. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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lable containers (such as paper milk cartons). The purpose of the stat-
ute was to promote conservation and ease waste disposal problems.2 7
There was evidence, however, that the statute's purpose was also to
promote the Minnesota pulpwood industry.12  The Court neverthe-
less upheld the statute under Pike. Although, "the out-of-state plas-
tics industry [was] burdened relatively more heavily than the
Minnesota pulpwood industry,... this burden [was] not 'clearly exces-
sive' in light of the substantial state interest in promoting conservation
... and easing solid waste disposal problems."' 29
Under the Pike test therefore, burdens on interstate commerce are
generally tolerated unless the Court dislikes the "nature of the local
interest." Protection of local economic interests by limiting access to
local markets 30 or by requiring business to be conducted within the
state that could just as easily be conducted elsewhere has led the
Court to strike down evenhanded measures.13' Protection of health,
safety, and the environment, however, are always considered legiti-
mate local interests and are usually upheld even where the burden on
interstate commerce is relatively heavy. 32
2. The European Court of Justice's Review of Restrictive Member
State Measures Under EC Treaty Articles 30 to 36 and
the Rule of Reason
The EC Treaty, unlike the United States Constitution, expressly
prohibits the restriction of intracommunity trade. 33 Specifically, Arti-
cles 30 and 34 prohibit quantitative restrictions on imports, exports,
and measures having equivalent effect between Member States.' 34
The European Court of Justice in Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville35
interpreted measures having equivalent effect to include "[a]ll trading
rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, di-
rectly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade."' 36
127. Id. 449 U.S. at 458-59.
128. Id at 475.
129. Id at 473.
130. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 415 (1988).
131. Id at 426.
132. See, e.g., Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 473-74 (upholding ban of
nonreturnable, nonreuseable plastic containers even though ban benefitted local in-
dustry because purpose of ban was to protect environment from plastic); Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 & n.18 (1978) (noting that safety regula-
tions are usually upheld because of a strong presumption of validity).
133. EC Treaty Articles 9-36 provide for the free movement of goods. Specifically,
Article 9 calls for the creation of a customs union and the eventual prohibition of
customs duties between Member States; Articles 12-17 provide for elimination of cus-
toms duties and measures having equivalent effect; Articles 30-36 provide for elimina-
tion of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect. EC 'reaty
Articles 48-73 provide for the free movement of workers, services and capital.
134. See supra note 67.
135. Case 8/74, 1974 E.C.R. 837, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 436 (1974).
136. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 852.
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This broad definition captures any measure that makes it more diffi-
cult or costly to import or export goods from one Member State to
another. 37
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The EC Treaty provides
specific exceptions to Articles 30 and 34 in Article 36138 and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice has further limited Articles 30 and 34 with the
"rule of reason" it developed in Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmono-
polverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon).13 9
a. Article 36
Article 36 allows Member States to restrict the free movement of
goods for certain enumerated reasons such as public morality, public
policy, and the protection of health and life of humans, animals, and
plants."n The Court of Justice has interpreted Article 36 very nar-
rowly, holding that it extends only to the enumerated justifications.14
Measures that restrict the free movement of goods on the grounds
listed in Article 36, however, are not automatically permitted. Two
provisions in the article require further analysis of these measures: (1)
"Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions ...
justified on [the enumerated grounds];" and (2) "Such prohibitions or
restrictions shall not ... constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade."' 42 The requirement that the
prohibitions or restrictions allowed under the article be "justified" and
137. See, e.g., Case 247/81, Commission v. Germany, 1984 E.C.RL 1111, 1122, (1985]
1 C.M.L.R. 640 (1984) (including under Article 30's prohibition measures that make
access to the domestic market conditional on the importer having an agent in the
Member State); Case 12/74, Commission v. Germany, 1975 E.C.R. 181, 199-200,
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 340 (1975) (including under Article 30's prohibition measures that
confine names not indicative of origin or source to domestic products only). The
Court of Justice narrowed the definition of measures having equivalent effect in Cases
C-267/91 & C-268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck & Mithouard, 1993 E.C.tR
1-6097, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101 (1993), by excluding from Article 30 restrictions on
"selling arrangements," i.e., marketing and advertising restrictions, provided they ap-
ply equally to all traders and products. This limitation does not effect the analysis in
this Note, however, because measures restricting the movement of products/goods
still clearly fall under Article 30.
138. EC Treaty art. 36. Article 36 reads:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restric-
tions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public
morality, public policy or public security, the protection of health and life of
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing
artistic, historic or archeological value; or the protection of industrial and
commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however,
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States.ld.
139. Case 120178, 1979 E.C.R_ 649, [1979] 3 C.M.LR. 494 (1979).
140. EC Treaty art. 36.
141. See Case 124/81, Commission v. United Kingdom (UHT Milk), 1983 E.C..L
203, 235, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (1983).
142. EC Treaty art. 36 (emphasis added).
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the disallowance of arbitrary discrimination have led the Court of Jus-
tice to apply the "principle of proportionality" to measures enacted on
one of the grounds in Article 36.1"3 This proportionality test requires
that a measure be proportionate in relation to the objective pursued,
i.e., that "the same result may [not] be achieved by means of less re-
strictive measures.""' In other words, the measure must employ the
least restrictive means "necessary to attain the legitimate aim.' 45
Article 36 does not require that the measure be evenhanded and the
Court of Justice has not distinguished between discriminatory and
nondiscriminatory measures in Article 36 cases. An evenhanded mea-
sure, however, is much more likely to be considered the least restric-
tive means of achieving a legitimate aim.
b. The Rule of Reason
The European Court of Justice created the rule of reason to deal
with Member State concerns that were not fully developed when Arti-
cle 36 was written but later became imperative. 46 Consumer rights
and environmental protection, for example, did not become important
concerns until the 1970s. 147 The court first articulated the rule of rea-
son in the landmark case, Cassis de Dijon:
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from dis-
parities between the national laws relating to the marketing of the
products in question must be... recognized as being necessary in
order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health,
the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense of the
consumer.
148
Only protection of public health clearly falls within Article 36 and de-
fense of the consumer clearly does not fall within the Court's narrow
interpretation of Article 36. Cassis de Dijon thus effectively expanded
the categories of purposes for which a Member State may restrict the
free movement of goods.
The rule of reason also included the proportionality analysis re-
quired under Article 36. Here again, the Court required that the mea-
sure employ the least restrictive means necessary to serve an
143. Case 174/82, Criminal Proceedings against Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R. 2445,
2463, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 43 (1983) (applying "the principle of proportionality which
underlies the last sentence of Article 36 of the Treaty").
144. UHT Milk, 1983 E.C.R. at 236.
145. Sandoz, 1983 E.C.R. at 2463.
146. See Bermann, supra note 39, at 353. Article 36 was written in 1957. Id.
147. Id.
148. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein(Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649, 662, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979). The term
"mandatory requirements" has been better translated in later judgments as impera-
tive state interests. See Bermann, supra note 39, at 356 n.2. Imperative state interests
in this context are comparable to legitimate state interests in the United States.
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imperative state interest. 4 9 Additionally, the Court of Justice re-
frained from distinguishing between discriminatory and evenhanded
measures. The court thus used the same analysis to determine the
validity of measures justified on the grounds of imperative state inter-
ests as it did to determine the validity of measures justified under Ar-
ticle 36.
Although Cassis de Dijon was not based on the discriminatory or
nondiscriminatory nature of the German minimum alcohol content
law, the law was evenhanded and later cases made evenhandedness a
requirement under the rule of reason. The Court of Justice later
maintained that imperative interests may be invoked as an exception
to Article 30 only where "national rules, which apply without discrimi-
nation to both domestic and imported products, may be justified as be-
ing necessary in order to satisfy [those] imperative requirements. 150
Some cases, however, undermine this condition on the rule of rea-
son by failing to discuss the issue of discrimination at all and by estab-
lishing new definitions of discrimination. In Commission v. Denmark
(Danish Bottles),' 5' for example, the Advocate General found a Dan-
ish law requiring that beer and soda be sold in returnable containers
approved by the Danish government to be discriminatory in effect and
therefore not eligible for rule of reason analysis. 1' The Court of Jus-
tice then upheld a portion of the law under the rule of reason without
discussing the issue of discrimination. 53 In Commission v. Belgium
(Walloon Waste),'- the Court of Justice again applied the rule of rea-
son to a law that the Advocate General had found facially discrimina-
tory. 55 The Belgian region of Wallonia had completely prohibited the
import of out-of-region waste but the Court of Justice stated that the
measure was not discriminatory because out-of-state waste differs
from in-state waste.' 56 Although this analysis seemingly created a
new definition of nondiscrimination for purposes of using the rule of
reason, most argue that the court simply applied the rule of reason to
149. See Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 662.
150. Case 788/79, Criminal Proceedings against GiUi and Andres, 1980 E.C.Rt 2071,
2078, [1981] 1 C.M.L.Rt 146 (1980) (emphasis added); see also Case 16183, Criminal
Proceedings against Prantl, 1984 E.C.R 1299, 1327, [1985] 2 C.M.LR. 238 (1984) (re-
quiring rules be "applicable to domestic and imported products alike" for justification
under rule of reason).
151. Case 302/86, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, [1989] 1 C.M.L.tR 619 (1988).
152. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4625 (opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon
Slynn).
153. Id at 4630.
154. Case C-2190, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4431, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1992).
155. See Walloon Waste, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-4457 (stating Advocate General Jacobs's
opinion that the measure "is plainly not indistinctly applicable to domestic and im-
ported products")
156. See id at 1-4480.
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a facially discriminatory measure.157 In either case, the court found
the measure proportional and valid under the EC Treaty. 5 s
c. Proportionality Analyses
The proportionality principle is at the heart of the Court of Justice's
analysis of restrictive state measures. After the court has determined
that the interest to be served falls under Article 36 or is legitimate
under the rule of reason, it must weigh the burden on intracommunity
trade with the benefit to the Member State to judge whether the mea-
sure employs the least restrictive means necessary to serve the identi-
fied interest.
In Commission v. United Kingdom (UHT Milk), 59 the United
Kingdom (the "U.K.") placed restrictions on the importation and sale
of UHT Milk by requiring import licenses and packaging within the
U.K. to guard against milk infected with cattle foot-and-mouth dis-
ease. The Court of Justice first noted that protecting health is justified
under Article 36 only if the measure is proportional to its objective.'6 °
The court then examined all the scientific evidence presented and de-
termined that the risk to health was minimal and thus the local benefit
small.16' The court suggested that certificates of quality ensuring that
certain safety procedures had been followed in treating and packaging
the milk would be adequate to protect U.K. citizens from infected
milk.' 62 The Court of Justice finally held that the law significantly im-
peded intracommunity trade and was more restrictive than necessary
to protect health.163
157. Id. at 1-4457 (stating Advocate General Jacobs's opinion that the measure was
discriminatory); Gerardin, supra note 31, at 189 (asserting that this is "the first time
that the Court of Justice used the [rule of reason] to uphold a trade restriction facially
discriminating against imports"); Peter von Wilmowsky, Waste Disposal in the Internal
Market: The State of Play After the ECJ's Ruling on the Walloon Import Ban, 30
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 541, 556 (1993) (questioning the reasoning of the Court of
Justice because "self-sufficient disposal regions represent a quantitative import re-
striction according to Article 30 EEC").
158. See Walloon Waste, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-4479 to 1-4480. This case is discussed in
depth in the context of the European Court of Justice's environmental protection
versus free movement of goods case law. See infra part III.C.
159. Case 124/81, 1983 E.C.R. 203, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (1983). UHT stands for
"ultra heat treated."
160. UHT Milk, 1983 E.C.R. at 236.
161. Id. at 238 (emphasizing the limited disparities in safety laws of Member States
regarding UHT milk and the ability of UHT milk to remain at normal temperatures
for long periods of time).
162. Id. at 236, 239.
163. Idt at 236, 240. In Case 261/85, Commission v. United Kingdom (Pasteurized
Milk), 1988 E.C.R. 547, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 11 (1988), the Court held that a ban on the
importation of pasteurized milk was disproportionate to the goal of protecting health
and invalidated the measure. Pasteurized Milk, 1988 E.C.R. at 575-77; cf. Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidating a local ordinance restricting
the import of pasteurized milk).
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In Commission v. Germany (Crayfish Import Ban),"6 Germany
prohibited the import of live crayfish for commercial purposes be-
cause it feared the spread of a crayfish plague that was widespread in
the Community.'65 The court accepted Germany's interest in the pro-
tection of animals and stated the proportionality principle as follows:
[R]ules restricting intra-Community trade are compatible with the
Treaty only in so far as they are indispensable for the purposes of
providing effective protection for the health and life of animals.
They cannot therefore be covered by the derogation provided for in
Article 36 if that aim may be achieved just as effectively by meas-
ures having less restrictive effects on intra-Community trade. 66
The Court of Justice examined the alternatives suggested by the Com-
mission and noted that Germany's legislation allowing derogation
from the ban if certain safety measures were taken indicated that Ger-
many found those measures sufficient to protect native crayfish.' 67
The court then determined that the means found adequate by the
Commission and Germany included less restrictive means such as in-
specting random samples, requiring health certificates, or regulating
the crayfish market.' 6 The ban was therefore invalid.
To the contrary, the court in Criminal Proceedings against CMC
Melkunie BV 69 permitted the Netherlands to bar imports of milk with
certain levels of bacteria allowed in other Member States because
"the data available at the present stage of scientific research do not
make it possible to determine with certainty [the level of bacteria that
is] a source of danger to human health. ' 1 ° Thus, when the evidence
does not clearly show that less restrictive means would be sufficient to
attain the level of protection deemed legitimate by the Court of Jus-
tice, the court defers to the Member State legislatures' decisions.
In Danish Bottles,"' after confirming that environmental protection
is an imperative state interest," the Court of Justice examined a Dan-
ish law requiring that all containers for beer and soft drinks be return-
able and be approved by the National Agency for the Protection of
the Environment (the "NAPE"). The Advocate General found both
164. Case C-131/93, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3303.
165. Crayfish Import Ban, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-3316 to 1-3317.
166. Id. at 1-3321.
167. Id. at 1-3323.
168. Id. at 1-3322; cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (upholding im-
port ban of live baitfish to protect from parasites because scientific evidence was
inconclusive).
169. Case 97/83, 1984 E.C.R. 2367, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 318 (1984).
170. Melkunie, 1984 E.C.R. at 2386; cf. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151-52 (upholding
Maine's ban on importation of live baitfish because scientific data was inconclusive).
171. Case 302/86, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, [1989] 1 C.M.LR 619 (1988).
172. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4607-08 (stating that protection of the environ-
ment is "'one of the Community's essential objectives,' which may, as such, justify
certain limitations of the principle of the free movement of goods.... [The protec-
tion of the environment is a mandatory requirement.").
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the compulsory deposit-and-return system and the NAPE inspection
system discriminatory in effect and disproportional to the legitimate
aim of encouraging recycling.173 The Court of Justice did not discuss
the issue of discrimination but analyzed the law under the rule of rea-
son anyway. The court agreed that the NAPE inspection system was
too restrictive because it forced producers not only to recover used
bottles but also to conform its containers to one of the limited forms
approved by the NAPE. 74 The deposit-and-return system, in con-
trast, was "an indispensable element of a system intended to ensure
the re-use of containers and therefore appears necessary to achieve
the aims pursued by the . . . rules. That being so, the restrictions
which it imposes on the free movement of goods cannot be regarded
as disproportionate.'"17 In upholding the recycling system, the Court
of Justice accepted a high level of environmental protection (recycling
of all bottles) as a legitimate Member State interest.
In Article 30 cases, the European Court of Justice demands that the
parties present evidence as to the necessity of the measure or the
existence of adequate alternatives and then carefully reviews that evi-
dence. The court defers to Member State legislative decisions when it
accepts that the asserted interest is viable and when the evidence is
either insufficient to determine the adequacy of available alternatives
or shows that adequate alternatives do not exist.
3. A Similar Approach to Determining the Constitutional Limits
on State/Member State Restrictions of Free Trade
The United States Supreme Court employs three different tests
when determining the constitutional limits on state restrictions of free
trade: (1) the Philadelphia "virtually per se invalidity" rule for arbi-
trarily discriminatory measures; (2) the Dean Milk "no adequate alter-
natives" test for other discriminatory measures; and (3) the Pike
balancing test for evenhanded measures. 76 The European Court of
Justice essentially uses one test when determining the constitutional
limits on Member State restrictions of free trade-the proportionality
test. 77 The Court of Justice's approach is very similar to the Supreme
Court's "no adequate alternatives" rule. Both require that the State
show a legitimate State interest and an absence of less restrictive ade-
quate means. Although the Supreme Court lowers its scrutiny when a
measure is evenhanded, it still balances the burden on interstate trade
with the benefit to the state and takes into consideration the nature of
the state's interest. The Court of Justice in its proportionality analysis
also weighs the burden on intracommunity trade, which is lower when
173. Id. at 4625-26 (opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn).
174. Id. at 4632.
175. Id. at 4630.
176. See supra part I.C.1.
177. See supra part I.C.2.
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a measure is evenhanded, with the benefits to the Member State, tak-
ing into consideration the importance and authenticity of the specific
interest at stake.
Discriminatory measures not justified under Article 36 but never-
theless founded on imperative state interests are generally not eligible
for the proportionality test and are per se invalid. The Court of Jus-
tice, however, recently formulated a test for discrimination that led it
to apply an analysis similar to the Supreme Court's analysis in Maine
v. Taylor.178 The Taylor Court first employed the Philadelphia test by
differentiating the relevant in-state and out-of-state items to find the
measure not arbitrarily discriminatory and then applied the Dean Milk
analysis for discriminatory measures. 179 The Court of Justice distin-
guished in-state and out-of-state items to find a measure nondiscrimi-
natory and therefore eligible for the proportionality analysis under the
rule of reason.'8 0 Although the reason for distinguishing in-state from
out-of-state items was different, the analysis and ultimate determina-
tions were the same.
A comparison of cases with similar facts shows a marked similarity
in the courts' approaches. UHT Milk, Pasteurized Milk, and Dean
Milk all involved restrictions on the import and sale of milk treated
outside the relevant local area. The European Court of Justice and
the Supreme Court struck them down because the measures put a
heavy burden on inter-State trade and less restrictive alternatives
were adequate to protect human health.'81 Crayfish Import Ban and
Taylor both concerned a ban on imports of non-native marine animals
to protect the native population from disease. Both courts examined
the scientific data and the current procedures for protection used in
the respective States.' l The Supreme Court found the data in Taylor
to be inconclusive and noted that Maine had not developed an inspec-
tion program due to a lack of adequate technology at the time. It
therefore deferred to the Maine legislature and upheld the ban as the
only adequate alternative. 1' The Court of Justice found the data in
Crayfish Import Ban sufficient to show that inspection and safety re-
quirements would be adequate to protect German crayfish and noted
that the German government already used these methods. It there-
fore found the measure disproportionate to the Member State goal
and invalidated it."8 Although the courts reached different results,
178. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
179. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
180. See Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium (Walloon Waste), 1992 E.C.R. I-
4431, 1-4432, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1992).
181. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing Dean Milk); notes
159-63 and accompanying text (discussing UHT Milk and Pasteurized Milk).
182. See supra notes 111-19 (discussing Taylor); notes 164-68 (discussing Crayfish
Import Ban).
183. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
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the analysis was the same. In addition, where scientific data is unclear
as to what action is necessary to protect a legitimate interest, like the
Supreme Court in Taylor, the Court of Justice defers to Member State
legislatures and upholds those measures. Melkunie is an example of
this analysis.' 85
Danish Bottles and Clover Leaf Creamery both concerned even-
handed laws that required the use of recyclable containers to en-
courage recycling and ease waste disposal problems. The Supreme
Court and the European Court of Justice found the chosen means ap-
propriate to their stated goals, which incorporated a high level of envi-
ronmental protection. 8 6 The only distinguishing factor between the
analyses is the Supreme Court's use of lower scrutiny; the Danish
measure had to surpass a higher hurdle to be considered valid.
The European Court of Justice generally makes an evidence-based
decision on the legitimacy of a local concern and the necessity of a
given means. If evidence does not make it clear that an adequate al-
ternative exists, the court defers to the Member State. Although the
Supreme Court did the same in Taylor and Clover Leaf Creamery, it
has not followed that route in its free movement of waste cases. The
two courts' analyses and ultimate decisions in free movement of waste
cases clearly diverge. This divergence is addressed in part IV.
II. THE SUPREME COURT FAILS To PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
FROM Tim FREE MOVEMENT OF WASTE
Environmental concerns exploded on the U.S. political scene in the
1960s in response to ecological catastrophes.' 87 On April 22, 1970,
twenty million Americans celebrated the country's first Earth Day,
hoping to "roll back environmental degradation."'88 Since then, envi-
ronmental awareness has changed the way many people think and
live, but how many people are aware of the waste disposal crisis?
How many people have significantly reduced consumption in the last
twenty-five years? Not enough.' 9 In light of this, who is supposed to
185. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (discussing Danish Bottles);
notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing Clover Leaf Creamery).
187. See Introduction of the Waste Export Control Act, 135 Cong. Rec. E1949-03
(1989) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.) (discussing how the "tragedies of Love
Canal and Tunes Beach brought home how devastating toxic contamination can be");
Julienne I. Adler, Comment, United States' Waste Export Control Program: Burying
Our Neighbors in Garbage, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 885, 885-87 & n.10 (1991) (describing
several incidents where garbage barges floated around for months and then mysteri-
ously lost their cargo); Frank Graham, Jr., Earth Day: 25 Years, Nat'l Geographic,
Apr. 1995, at 122-24 (discussing the advent of Earth Day in response to a new aware-
ness of severe environmental degradation).
188. Graham, supra note 187, at 124.
189. Senator D'Amato noted in 1988 that the United States "is on the brink of a
waste management crisis" because "[m]ost people give little thought to what happens
to their garbage when they bag it and put it out on the curbside for pickup." Proceed-
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inform the people and protect our environment, our health, and our
safety from all this garbage? Local government and the States are
supposed to establish comprehensive waste management schemes that
promote reduction, reuse, recycling, burning, and disposal in that or-
der.190 They can do this by setting goals for a maximum amount of
waste production the state can handle safely, by creating a sense of
responsibility for one's own consumption, and by reducing the move-
ment of waste. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court disagrees.
Although it generally favors environmental protection as a state goal,
it has deemed that goal irrelevant in its free movement of waste cases,
thwarting many state attempts at waste management.
A. Environmental Cases Generally
The Supreme Court recognizes conservation and environmental
protection as not only legitimate, but compelling state interests. 191
Generally, if the Court believes that environmental protection is truly
the state measure's primary purpose, it will uphold the measure
against a Commerce Clause challenge. The Court looks particularly
favorably on evenhanded environmental state measures, usually ac-
cepting the environmental purpose and at times not even going
through the Pike balancing test before declaring the measure
constitutional."9
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 93 for example, the Court
went out of its way to accept Minnesota's environmental purpose for
prohibiting the use of nonreturnable plastic containers. Despite the
state court's determination that the statute's purpose was to promote
Minnesota's pulpwood industry at the expense of the completely out-
of-state plastics industry,194 the Supreme Court accepted the legisla-
ture's enunciated goal of promoting conservation and easing solid
waste disposal problems and applied the Pike test. The Court found
ings and Debates on the Waste Export Control Act, 134 Cong. Rec. S13205-01 (1988)
(statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato).
190. Agenda for Action, supra note 18, at 16-17.
191. See e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981)
(noting the "substantial state interest in promoting conservation of energy and other
natural resources and easing solid waste disposal problems").
192. Geradin, supra note 31, at 158-59. Some lower federal courts and state courts
have adopted this view and, instead of engaging in balancing, have simply determined
if the measure is reasonable. See; e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509
F.2d 69,76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (holding that where burden on
interstate commerce is light and end is properly of local concern, any reasonable
means will be constitutional); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n,
517 P.2d 691, 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (claiming inability to weigh environmental ben-
efits against economic loss).
193. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
194. Id. at 475.
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the law valid even though it heavily burdened out-of-state industry
while promoting in-state industry.195
The Court went even further in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit.19 6 There the Court upheld a statute that limited the emis-
sions of smoke within the city and harbor without applying any test:
"The claim that the Detroit ordinance ... imposes... an undue bur-
den on interstate commerce needs no extended discussion. State reg-
ulation, based on the police power, [and] which does not discriminate
against interstate commerce... may constitutionally stand."'197 The
court noted that the "ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose
of promoting the health and welfare of the city's inhabitants. Legisla-
tion designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe
clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of
what is compendiously known as the police power.' '198 An even-
handed environmental statute then will almost certainly survive dor-
mant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
Discriminatory statutes, however, are regarded with more suspicion
than evenhanded statutes. Nonetheless, where the Court believes that
a measure's true purpose is environmental protection, it carefully ex-
amines the evidence and gives deference to legislative choices. Maine
v. Taylor'99 exemplifies this reasoning. The Court in Taylor rejected
the indications of protectionist intent found by the Court of Appeals
and the evidence presented in support of less discriminatory alterna-
tives,200 and deferred to the state's choice of means to protect its
environment:
"[T]he constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause
cannot be read as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and
wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has oc-
curred or until the scientific community agrees on what disease or-
ganisms are or are not dangerous before it acts to avoid such
consequences.",
201
When a state does not needlessly obstruct trade or economically iso-
late itself, it retains "broad regulatory authority to protect the health
and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources. '' 202
Because the Commerce Clause "does not elevate free trade above all
other values, 20 3 the Court maintained the value of environmental
protection by upholding a facially discriminatory statute.
195. Id at 473.
196. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
197. Id at 448.
198. Id at 442.
199. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
200. Id. at 148-51.
201. Id. at 148 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me.
1984)).




In contrast, where the Court thinks the discriminatory measure's
purpose is more economic than environmental, the Court easily dis-
covers or simply presumes the existence of adequate alternatives.
Hughes v. Oklahoma0° exemplifies this reasoning. The Hughes Court
doubted the conservational purpose of Oklahoma's ban on the export
of minnows because the state did not restrict the catching or use of
minnows in the state. The state chose "to 'conserve' its minnows in
the way that most overtly discriminates against interstate commerce"
and in a way that poorly served its purported purpose. 05 This evi-
dence supported the view that the primary purpose was to protect the
Oklahoma minnow market. The Court did not even suggest alterna-
tives before holding the statute "repugnant to the Commerce
Clause."' 6
The Court has protected state environmental goals at the expense
of free trade in many instances. It has upheld both evenhanded and
discriminatory measures against Commerce Clause challenges and has
specifically noted that free trade is not a more important value than
environmental protection.
When states have sincerely attempted to protect the environment
by enacting measures that restrict the flow of waste across state lines,
however, the Supreme Court has found the environmental interest ir-
relevant and struck down the measures based on a theory of arbitrary
discrimination.
B. The Free Movement of Waste Cases
The Supreme Court first upheld local efforts to manage solid waste
by controlling waste flow in 1905. 01 Today, through the seemingly
endless expansion of federal power under the Commerce Clause,208
Congress has begun to regulate the traditional state function of waste
management.209 But Congress has left the job unfinished and the
204. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
205. Id. at 337-38. The Court noted that the late assertion of a conservation pur-
pose gave that purpose "the flavor of a post hoc rationalization." Id. at 338 n20.
206. Id. at 338; cf. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 354 (1977) (giving examples of less discriminatory but more effective alternatives
based on common knowledge).
207. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 325
(1905) (upholding San Francisco ordinance requiring all refuse generated within the
city to be disposed of at specific, private facility); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325,
333 (1905) (upholding Detroit ordinance requiring all garbage to be collected and
disposed of by a single operator).
208. But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that federal
regulation of guns near schools is not valid under the Commerce Clause and is thus an
unconstitutional usurpation of state police power).
209. See, e.g., RCRA, supra note 2 (regulating hazardous waste management);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.




states to pick up the slack. The states have tried to manage solid
waste in various ways. States have, for example, tried to preserve
landfill space by reducing or prohibiting the in-flow of waste from
other states.21° States have imposed higher dumping fees or higher
taxes on out-of-state producers to discourage the in-flow of waste and
to ensure that producers pay for the cost of managing their waste. 11
States have enacted efficient solid waste management schemes that
require counties to landfill first their own waste and then any addi-
tional waste the county can manage.212 States have allowed local gov-
ernments to control the flow of waste to encourage self-sufficiency
and ensure the financial viability of efficient waste management.2 13
But the Supreme Court has invalidated each of these measures under
the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court first addressed interstate movement of waste in
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.21 4 New Jersey prohibited the im-
portation of most solid and liquid waste in order to protect the envi-
ronment and the health and safety of its citizens from the
accumulation of waste in its overburdened landfills.215 In light of ear-
lier Supreme Court cases holding that some objects "are not legiti-
mate subjects of trade and commerce '216 because "on account of their
existing condition,... [they] *are ... unfit for human use or consump-
tion, '21 7 the Court's first inquiry was whether the Commerce Clause
even protected "valueless" waste. The Court found that these earlier
"quarantine cases" did not remove a set of items from Commerce
Clause protection, but rather identified items whose worth in inter-
state commerce was far outweighed by local safety concerns. Waste
was thus an article of commerce deserving of Commerce Clause
protection.21 8
210. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (requiring authorization by county to dispose of out-of-
county waste); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (im-
posing additional fee for disposal of hazardous waste generated outside Alabama);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (banning the importation of
most waste collected or originating outside New Jersey).
211. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S.
Ct. 1345 (1994) (imposing additional fee for disposal of solid waste generated outside
Oregon); Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. 334 (imposing additional fee for disposal of haz-
ardous waste generated outside Alabama).
212. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. 353 (requiring county authorization to dispose
of out-of-county waste in county landfills).
213. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994)
(requiring all solid waste generated in town to be separated at a designated transfer
station).
214. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
215. Id at 625. The text of the New Jersey statute sets out its purpose. See supra
note 98 (quoting the text of the statute).
216. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622 (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125
U.S. 465, 489 (1888)).
217. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 489.
218. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622-23.
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In response to arguments that waste creates the same kind of dan-
ger as the items prohibited from importation in the quarantine
cases,2 19 the Court distinguished those cases, stating:
[T]hose quarantine laws banned the importation of articles such as
diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible be-
cause their very movement risked contagion and other evils. Those
laws thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce as such,
but si ly prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their
origin.
The Court admitted that New Jersey might be able to constitutionally
prohibit waste importation under the quarantine precedents if "the
very movement of waste into or through New Jersey endangers health,
or ... [if] waste must be disposed of as soon and as close to its point of
generation as possible"'2' but noted that New Jersey had not asserted
this' ' Attempting then to distinguish solid waste from the "noxious
articles" it had described, the Court declared that waste creates the
harms to be prevented only after disposal, not when generated or
moved.?' New Jersey had thus arbitrarily discriminated against out-
of-state waste by banning it, but not in-state waste, from its landfills.
The Court then created a virtually per se invalidity rule for discrimi-
natory measures and struck down the New Jersey statute. According
to its new rule, only if domestic waste could be distinguished from
foreign waste or if waste fit into the Court's quarantine analysis could
a statute restricting the flow of waste possibly withstand Commerce
Clause scrutiny. 224 Ignoring over twenty years of precedent, the Court
refused entirely to address the adequacy of less restrictive means to
the legitimate end of environmental protection. New Jersey's "arbi-
trarily" discriminatory statute was per se invalid as economic protec-
tionism regardless of legislative intent or an absence of adequate
alternatives.
Although Philadelphia created a per se rule of invalidity for arbi-
trarily discriminatory state statutes, Hughes v. Oklahoma- s later ap-
plied the general rule from Dean Milk to strike down a facially
discriminatory statute without a legitimate basis for distinguishing in-
state and out-of-state minnows.2 6 Maine v. Taylor2 7 upheld a facially
discriminatory statute under the general rule but distinguished Phila-
delphia based on Maine's legitimate reason for distinguishing out-of-
219. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
220. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628-29.
221. Id. at 629.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 97-105 and accompanying text.
225. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
226. See id. at 336-38.
227. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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state from native fish." 8 The next time the Court faced a state statute
restricting interstate movement of waste was fourteen years after Phil-
adelphia in both Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan De-
partment of Natural Resources229 and Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt.2 30 In both cases, "states attempted to recast Philadelphia
as not in tune with modern knowledge regarding the hazards of waste
disposal and serious state efforts being made to plan for and dispose
of waste."23 The Court, however, rejected these arguments and ap-
plied Philadelphia without considering its flawed reasoning or the pos-
sibility that the measures in question should pass scrutiny even under
the Philadelphia rubric.
Fort Gratiot concerned a provision in Michigan's Solid Waste Man-
agement Act ("SWMA"). The SWMA established a comprehensive
waste management effort including local input and local responsibility
such that each county planned for safe disposal of its own waste over
the next twenty years. As part of that plan, Michigan enacted a provi-
sion prohibiting private landfill operators from accepting waste from
outside the county unless explicitly authorized by the receiving
county's waste management plan. When St. Clair County denied peti-
tioner Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill this authority, the provision ef-
fectively prohibited the importation of waste into the county and led
to a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. 32 The Court's first sub-
stantive statement was "Philadelphia v. New Jersey provides the
framework for our analysis of this case. '2 33 Although the Court men-
tioned the Dean Milk "no adequate alternatives" test,234 it refused to
apply the test because Michigan had not argued that it could prove the
absence of adequate alternatives. 235 The Court stated the standard it
would apply as follows: "A state statute that clearly discriminates
against interstate commerce is ... unconstitutional 'unless the discrim-
ination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to eco-
nomic protectionism." '236
Michigan first argued that its provision applied evenhandedly to in-
state and out-of-state waste by banning both from importation into
the county. The Court rejected this argument because a "State...
228. Id at 150-52.
229. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
230. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
231. Stanley E. Cox, What May States Do About Out-of-State Waste in Light of
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause? Kentucky
as Case Study in the Waste Wars, 83 Ky. L.J. 551, 571 (1994).
232. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 355-57.
233. Id. at 359.
234. Id. at 366 ("Because those provisions unambiguously discriminate against in-
terstate commerce, the State bears the burden of proving that they further health and
safety concerns that cannot be adequately served by nondiscriminatory
alternatives.").
235. See id at 366 n.8.
236. Id. at 359 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988)).
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may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the
movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State,
rather than through the State itself."'' The measure was therefore
discriminatory. Michigan then argued to no avail that the SWMA
constituted a comprehensive health and safety regulation rather than
economic protectionism and that the restrictions were necessary to
provide safe, efficient disposal. The Court held that absent any show-
ing that the imported waste "raised health or other concerns not
presented by Michigan waste,"'' 38 the measure was appropriately char-
acterized as protectionist and thus could not withstand Commerce
Clause scrutiny. 39 Philadelphia "control[led] the disposition of this
case."''
240
Chemical Waste presented a similar problem. In response to a large
increase in the volume of hazardous waste entering Alabama, Ala-
bama capped the amount of and imposed a disposal fee on all hazard-
ous waste disposed of at its facilities. Alabama also imposed an
additional disposal fee for all hazardous waste generated outside of
Alabama. 41 Only the discriminatory fee was at issue before the
Supreme Court. The State argued that the additional fee served sev-
eral purposes: (1) protection of health and safety; (2) conservation of
the environment; (3) compensation for the burdens imposed by out-
of-state generators dumping in Alabama; and (4) reduction of risks
created by the flow of waste on the state's highways. 4 Although the
Court cited the Dean Milk general rule and suggested some alterna-
tives, Philadelphia once again controlled the outcome because the
Court found in-state and out-of-state waste indistinguishable? 43
To the extent Alabama's concern touches environmental conserva-
tion and the health and safety of its citizens, such concern does not
vary with the point of origin of the waste .... Even with the possi-
ble future ... environmental risks to be borne by Alabama, such
risks likewise do not vary with the waste's State of oriin in a way
allowing foreign, but not local, waste to be burdened.
The Court also found the quarantine cases inapplicable for the same
reasons it stated in Philadelphia.'4
237. Id. at 361.
238. Id. at 367.
239. Id. at 367-68.
240. Id. at 361.
241. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 338-39 (1992). The
Alabama Supreme Court found all three provisions constitutional, holding in particu-
lar that the additional fee advanced legitimate local purposes that could not be ade-
quately served by nondiscriminatory alternatives. The Supreme Court granted
certiori limited to the challenge of the discriminatory fee. Id at 339.
242. Id at 343.
243. Id. at 342, 344-46.
244. Id. at 345-46.
245. Id. at 346-47.
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The Court again addressed the free movement of waste only two
years later in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environ-
mental Quality4 6 and C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown.17
Oregon Waste presented the same issue as Chemical Waste, a discrimi-
natory waste disposal fee. Oregon imposed a $2.25 per ton surcharge
on in-state disposal of waste generated outside Oregon and only a
$0.85 per ton disposal fee on waste generated in Oregon. 48 The mea-
sure was facially discriminatory and therefore subject to the "virtually
per se rule of invalidity. " 249 At this point, the Court seemed to merge
the per se invalidity test from Philadelphia with the "no adequate al-
ternatives" test from Dean Milk:
Because the Oregon surcharge is discriminatory, the virtually per se
rule of invalidity provides the proper legal standard here, not the
Pike balancing test. As a result, the surcharge must be invalidated
unless respondents can "sho[w] that it advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives."250
The Court, however, did not discuss legitimate purposes or adequate
alternatives but rather "legitimate reasons to subject waste from other
States to a higher charge than is levied against waste from Oregon."2 5''
This simply employs the Philadelphia means analysis dependent on
distinguishing in-state and out-of-state goods. In making its analysis,
the Court noted that the State failed to raise any health or safety rea-
sons to reduce the flow of waste into Oregon that were properly based
on the unique nature of out-of-state waste. It also found all other
proffered reasons for treating out-of-state waste differently than in-
state waste illegitimate.5 2 The discriminatory fee was held "facially
invalid under the negative Commerce Clause. '112 3
Carbone buried all hopes of effective waste management or waste
reduction. In an effort to efficiently manage its own waste, Clarks-
town, New York created a plan to finance a state-of-the-art waste
transfer station by guaranteeing a minimum waste flow and allowing
the contractor to charge a per-ton tipping fee. To meet that guaran-
246. 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
247. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
248. Oregon Waste, 114 S. Ct. at 1348.
249. Id. at 1351.
250. Id, (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
251. Id
252. Ia at 1351, 1355. One proffered reason was cost differential. Oregonians paid
state taxes partially to pay for waste disposal. Producers from out of state did not pay
the tax and thus could make up the difference by paying a surcharge. The Court
found that Oregon's system was not a compensatory tax nor a legitimate cost spread-
ing scheme. Id. at 1353-54. Another reason was protection of natural resources. The
Court ruled that a State may not afford its own citizens a preferred right of access to
its natural resources. Id. at 1354 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 627 (1978)).
253. Id. at 1355.
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tee, the town passed a flow control ordinance requiring all solid waste
in the town (generated inside or outside of the town) to be processed
at the designated transfer station before leaving the municipality6 -
Although the measure was facially neutral as it applied to all waste
haulers, the Court found a discriminatory impact on interstate com-
merce. It reasoned that compelling everyone who sent their waste
into Clarkstown to pay the extra tipping fee drove up the cost for out-
of-state producers to dispose of their solid waste and deprived other
processors of access to the local market. 55 The article of commerce
was "not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of
processing and disposing of it"' "6 and the town had "bar[red] the im-
port of the processing service." 2-57
Having found the ordinance discriminatory in effect, the Court
noted that the "central rationale for the rule against discrimination is
to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic pro-
tectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory
measures the Constitution was designed to prevent."2 5 8 In laying out
the standard for discriminatory legislation, the Court again merged
the per se test with the Dean Milk general rule: "Discrimination
against interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is
per se invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality
can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means
to advance a legitimate local interest."25 9 This time, however, it actu-
ally followed the Dean Milk analysis. The Court addressed a "number
of amici" arguing that depleted landfill space and increasing cleanup
costs make flow control "necessary to ensure the safe handling and
proper treatment of solid waste"' 260 but rejected the arguments be-
cause Clarkstown had "any number of nondiscriminatory alternatives
for addressing the health and environmental problems alleged to jus-
tify the ordinance."' The financing purpose was not even considered
legitimate.262  The ordinance was therefore unconstitutional.2c
Although the Court gave only a cursory analysis under the "no ade-
quate alternative" test, applying it at all was a step in the right
direction.
254. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. C. 1677, 1680 (1994).
255. ld. at 1681-82.
256. Id. at 1682.
257. Id. at 1683. As the Court amusingly put it, the town "hoards solid waste, and
the demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of the preferred processing facility." Id.
258. Id. at 1682 (emphasis added). Philadelphia clearly does not include an analysis
of "the object" of a law as the ends were there deemed irrelevant. City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
259. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1683.
260. Id
261. Id.




Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, invalidated the ordi-
nance for a different reason. In her view, the ordinance was even-
handed but imposed "an excessive burden on interstate
commerce." 2 4 The ordinance did not discriminate in any way on the
basis of origin but rather achieved a monopoly at the expense of all
competitors. 65 The measure nevertheless violated the Commerce
Clause because squelching competition in the waste processing service
altogether imposed a burden on interstate commerce clearly excessive
in relation to Clarkstown's legitimate aim of financing proper waste
disposal.266
The Supreme Court has reviewed five measures aimed at protecting
the environment by restricting the flow of waste across state lines,
four of which include state waste management schemes that imple-
ment point source management and self-sufficiency principles.267
These principles are part of a voiced, but not enacted, national envi-
ronmental protection policy. Congress has found that "[c]ontinued
exports of solid waste serve as a disincentive to implementation of
existing domestic policy, which recognizes waste reduction and re-
cycling as the best methods of solid waste management. '268 The
United States has signed and attempted to implement the Basel Con-
vention, an international treaty that restricts transfrontier movement
of hazardous waste,2 69 but has so far failed to enact the implementing
legislation required to become a member.270 Although the states have
attempted to manage the nation's waste disposal crisis in a manner
consistent with national environmental protection policy, because
Congress has not enacted legislation clearly giving states the authority
to restrict the flow of waste, the Supreme Court has invalidated each
state measure.
264. Il at 1687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
265. Ia at 1689.
266. Id at 1690-91.
267. For a description of point source management and self-sufficiency principles,
see infra part III.A.
268. H.R. 2580, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also H.R. 3706, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (stating the same finding).
269. See supra note 26 (explaining the Basel Convention's goals and means of
achieving them).
270. See Rod Hunter, A Hazardous Proposal for Waste, Wall St. J. Eur., Sept. 19,
1995, at 8 (noting that although the European Union is a party, the United States is
not a party because it has yet to ratify the Basel Convention). Congress has made
several attempts to implement the Basel Convention but has failed each time. See,
e.g., H.R. 3965, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (proposing a Bill to amend the Solid
Waste Disposal Act to implement the Basel Convention); H.R. 3706, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (proposing a Bill to prohibit the international export and import of cer-
tain solid waste); H.R. 2580, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (same); S. 1082, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991) (proposing a Bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to restrict
and monitor the import and export of waste and implement the Basel Convention).
1200 [Vol. 65
1996] MANAGING INTERSTATE WASTE 1201
III. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE PROTECTS THE
ENviRoNvENT FROM THE FREE MovEMENT OF WASTE
Unlike the Supreme Court, the European Court of Justice has in-
corporated Community environmental protection policies and mod-
em views on the nature of waste and the exigencies of proper waste
disposal into its free movement of goods jurisprudence. Because the
European Union must deal with the mounting problem of waste dis-
posal,271 the Member States included in the EC Treaty a section on
the environment.=2 Under these and other treaty provisions, the
Community has enacted several regulations and directives and issued
several policy statements concerning waste management and dispo-
sal.273 The Community, however, has been unable to control the
problem due to its own sluggish methods274 and due to certain provi-
sions in the EC Treaty allowing Member States to derogate from this
legislation for purposes of protecting the environment.275 Articles
271. Williams, supra note 60, at 143 (noting that in 1986, more than 55% of the EC
population considered the problem of environmental protection to be "immediate
and urgent"); Waste/fEnvironment Policy: European Union Lacking Ideas According
to Mr. De Sadeleer, Eur. Env't, 1996 WL 8758948, Jan. 23, 1996, at *4 [hereinafter
Lacking Ideas] ("Production of waste [in the EU] continues to grow.").
272. EC Treaty tit. XVI. Title XVI on Environment contains three Articles: Arti-
cle 130r setting forth objectives and methods of attainment; Article 130s setting out a
procedure for the adoption of Community environmental legislation; and Article 130t
reserving to the Member States the power to introduce more stringent measures com-
patible with the Treaty.
273. See, eg., Parliament and Council Directive 94/62 on Packaging and Packaging
Waste, 1994 OJ. (L 365) 10; Council Regulation 259/93 EEC on the Supervision and
Control of Shipments of Waste Within, Into and Out of the European Community,
1993 OJ. (L 30) 1; Council Resolution on Waste Policy, 1990 OJ. (C 122) 2; Council
Directive 91/156 EEC amending Directive 75/442 EEC on Waste, 1991 OJ. (L 78) 32;
Council Directive 91/689 EEC on Hazardous Waste, 1991 OJ. (L 377) 20.
274. See Lacking Ideas, supra note 271, at *2. Nicolas de Sadeleer, one of the lead-
ing specialists on European environment law, commented-
Community legislation governing waste has played an important role in the
rapid development of national and regional regulations in Western Europe
over the last twenty years.... By obliging the Member States to adopt rules
on the management, recovery and disposal of all types of waste ... Commu-
nity law played a pioneering role.
Since then, the influence exerted by the European Community appears to be
showing the first signs of running out of steam ....
•.. When faced with real problems, the Member States will then have to
make do without Community-scale harmonization-too slow, too com-
plex-and intervene directly themselves even if it means provoking distor-
tions in the market.
Id. at *2-3.
275. EC Treaty arts. 100a(4), 130t. Article 100a(4) allows the Member States to
derogate from measures enacted under Article 100a(1) on the internal market:
If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the Council acting by a
qualified majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply national pro-
visions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to
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100a(4) and 130t allow Member States to enact measures to protect
the environment but only to the extent compatible with the EC
Treaty.276 Articles 30 and 34, therefore, still limit the Member States'
ability to enact environmental protection measures that restrict the
free movement of goods. The ECJ interprets those limits and has
found that environmental protection in the form of point source man-
agement and self-sufficiency is an imperative state interest that must
be carefully balanced against the values of free trade and market
unity.
A. The European Union Environmental Policies of Proximity and
Self-Sufficiency
EC Treaty Article 130r(1) sets out the objectives to be pursued
through the Community's environmental policy:
-preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the
environment;
-protecting human health;
-prudent and rational utilization of natural resources;
-promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or
worldwide environmental problems. 7
Article 130r(2) describes that policy: "Community policy on the envi-
ronment shall aim at a high level of protection .... It shall be based
on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventative
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a prior-
ity be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.127 8 Based
on these provisions, the Community has adopted two major princi-
ples-the "proximity principle" and the "self sufficiency principle"-
protection of the environment ... it shall notify the Commission of these
provisions.
The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after having veri-
fied that they are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on trade between Member States.
EC Treaty art. 100a(4). Article 130t allows the Member States to derogate from
measures enacted under Article 130s on protection of the environment: "The protec-
tive measures adopted pursuant to Article 130s shall not prevent any Member States
from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such measures
must be compatible with this Treaty." EC Treaty art. 130t. It should be noted, how-
ever, that both derogation provisions confine those derogations to measures compati-
ble with the Treaty and thus more specifically with Article 30's and Article 34's limits
on restricting the free movement of goods.
Another consequence of these provisions is that the EC has not been able to pre-
empt Member State legislation in the area of non-hazardous waste. See supra note 30.
276. EC Treaty arts. 100a(4), 130t.
277. EC Treaty art. 130r(1).
278. EC Treaty art. 130r(2). For a general discussion of the Community's environ-
mental policy, see Dr. Ludwig Kramer, E.C. Treaty and Environmental Law 45-70
(1995). For a discnssion of the Community's Environmental Action Programmes, see
Stanley P. Johnson & Guy Corcelle, The Environmental Policy of the European Com-
munities 11-21 (1989).
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aimed at protecting the environment through waste reduction and
point source management. 79
The proximity principle, or point source management, is a funda-
mental part of the Community's waste management policy.u ° It re-
quires that waste be disposed of by the safest means available and as
close to its source as possible38 l This approach minimizes the trans-
port of dangerous material, reduces waste generation by creating
awareness of disposal problems and encouraging responsibility at the
local level, leads to efficient waste management plans by limiting the
space available for disposal, and prevents the large imbalances in envi-
ronmental risk that arise when waste may be sent to the cheapest land
for disposal.282
279. The proximity and self-sufficiency principles first appeared in the Commu-
nity's 3rd Environmental Action Programme (1982-1986) and then in the 4th Envi-
ronmental Action Programme (1987-92). See Johnson & Corcelle, supra note 278, at
17-19.
280. EC Treaty art 130r(2) ("[E]nvironmental damage should ... be rectified at
source.. . ."); Common Position 4/96 on Landfill of Waste, 1996 Q.J. (C 59) 1, 1
("Member States should be able to apply the principles of proximity and self-suffi-
ciency for the elimination of their waste at Community and national levels."); Council
Regulation 259/93 EEC on Shipments of Waste, pmbL, 1993 OJ. (L 30) 1,2 ("Mem-
ber States should be able to implement the principles of proximity, priority for recov-
ery and self-sufficiency... by taking measures ... to prohibit generally or partially or
to object systematically to shipments of waste for disposal .... "); Council Directive
91/156 EEC on Waste, pmbL, 1991 OJ. (L 78) 32, 32 ("[M]ovements of waste should
be reduced and... Member States may take the necessary measures to that end in
their management plans."), art. 5(2), 1991 OJ. (L 78) 32, 34 ("The network must also
enable waste to be disposed of in one of the nearest appropriate installations... in
order to ensure a high level of protection for the environment and public health.");
Council Resolution on Waste Policy, pmbL, 1990 OJ. (C 122) 2, 2 ("[fln the interest
of environmental protection ..... production of waste should... be prevented or
reduced at source... [and] movements of waste should be reduced to the minimum
necessary for environmentally safe disposal. .. ").
281. EC Treaty art. 130r(2) ("[E]nvironmental damage should... be rectified at
source .... "); Council Resolution on Waste Policy, pmbL, 1990 OJ. (C 122) 2,2 ("[Ijn
the interest of environmental protection ..... production of waste should ... be
prevented or reduced at source... [and] movements of waste should be reduced to
the minimum necessary for environmentally safe disposal .... "); Council Directive
91/156 EEC on Waste, pmbL, 1991 OJ. (L 78) 32, 32 ("[Movements of waste should
be reduced and ... Member States may take the necessary measures to that end in
their management plans."), art. 5(2), 1991 OJ. (L 78) 32, 34 ("The network must also
enable waste to be disposed of in one of the nearest appropriate installations ... in
order to ensure a high level of protection for the environment and public health.");
Basel Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 4(2)(b, d) (demanding waste management occur
in the country of its source and transboundary movement of waste be reduced); see
also Jennifer R. Kitt, Note, Waste Exports to the Developing World: A Global Re-
sponse, 7 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 485, 495 (1995) (describing the objectives encom-
passed within the proximity principle); Andrew Evans Skroback, Note, Even a Sacred
Cow Must Live in a Green Pasture.: The Proximity Principle, Free Movement of
Goods, and Regulation 259/93 on Transfrontier Waste Shipments Within the EC, 17
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 85, 87 (1994) (analyzing the purposes of the proximity
principle and describing the principle as "fundamental").
282. See Skroback, supra note 281, at 91 (arguing that implementation of the prox-
imity principle with forestall further imbalance in waste disposal and decrease the
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The self-sufficiency principle is also extremely important to the
Community's waste management goals. 83 Self-sufficiency aims at re-
ducing or eliminating waste exports in an effort to force responsibility
for waste disposal on those who generate it.2 4 Its goals overlap with
the proximity goals. Final waste disposal in the country of generation
limits available disposal space, balances environmental risks, and most
importantly, creates a sense of responsibility. Responsibility in turn
produces responsible action. When people know that their waste will
be "dumped in their backyard," it suddenly becomes more important
to reduce, recycle, reuse, and implement very efficient waste disposal
systems.
The proximity and self-sufficiency principles guide the Member
States' and the Community's waste management policies at the na-
tional, Community, and international levels.285  As the European
Union's Environment Commissioner, Ritt Bjerreggard, has stated,
"We cannot continue to think we can deal with our waste problems by
exporting them. '286 At the national and Community levels, the Com-
munity and its members worry that "the abolition of all internal fron-
tiers will greatly weaken controls on waste management, thus
increasing the chances of exportation from higher producing States to
the cheapest, and probably least safe disposers. As production of
waste grows, so grow concerns of 'waste tourism' across Europe.) 287
They have thus implemented the proximity and self-sufficiency princi-
hazards of long-distance waste hauling); see also Council: EEC Hold-Up on Move-
ment of Waste, Eur. Info. Serv., Europe Energy, 1992 WL 2735707, *1 (Apr. 3, 1992)
(quoting French Prime Minister Brice Lalonde's comment, "We do not want to be-
come a rubbish dump for the Community.").
283. See Common Position 4/96, 1996 O.J. (C 59) 1, 1 ("Member States should be
able to apply the principles of proximity and self-sufficiency for the elimination of
their waste at Community and national levels."); Council Regulation 259/93 EEC on
Shipments of Waste, 1993 O.J. (L 30) 1, 2 ("Member States should be able to imple-
ment the principles of proximity, priority for recovery and self-sufficiency... by tak-
ing measures ... to prohibit generally or partially or to object systematically to
shipments of waste for disposal . . . ."); Council Directive 91/156 EEC on Waste,
pmbl., 1991 O.J. (L 78) 32, 32 ("[I]t is desirable for Member States individually to aim
at... self-sufficiency .... ").
284. See Kitt, supra note 281, at 495; Skroback, supra note 281, at 87.
285. See Kurt M. Rozesky, European Economic Communities-Environmental
Policy-Legal Basis and International Implications of Council Regulation on the Su-
pervision and Control of Shipments of Hazardous Waste, 23 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.
111, 139 (1993). Mr. Rozelsky noted:
By requiring notification and consent upon shipments of waste, the Waste
Shipment Regulation safeguards intra-Community shipments to ensure
proper disposal of waste as near the source as possible, while allowing for
the economic disparities of the smaller states. In the international arena, the
Community has initiated a new era of environmental policy that should pro-
vide a successful model for the coexistence of intra-Community and extra-
Community environmental protection.
lId
286. Hunter, supra note 270, at 8.
287. Rozelsky, supra note 285, at 125.
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pies within the Community. At the international level, the Commu-
nity has implemented the Basel Convention on the movement of
hazardous wastes and their disposal, which also adopts point source
management and self-sufficiency as two of the cornerstones of its envi-
ronmental/trade policy.' The Basel Convention today includes
ninety-eight nations. ' The United States has signed the Convention
but has not yet enacted the implementing legislation required to be-
come a member.29° Apparently much of the global community be-
lieves these policies will work to protect the local and global
environment.
B. Environmental Protection Is an Imperative State Interest
The European Court of Justice first recognized environmental pro-
tection as an essential objective capable of limiting the principle of
free trade in Procureur de la R~publique v. Association de Defence des
Braleurs d'huiles Usag~es (Waste Oils).291 The Court of Justice consid-
ered not a Member State measure but rather a Community measure
that restricted the free movement of goods. The court maintained:
[T]he principle of freedom of trade is not to be viewed in absolute
terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the objectives of
general interest pursued by the Community provided that the rights
in question are not substantively impaired.
288. Council Decision 93/98 EEC on the Conclusion, on Behalf of the Community,
of the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste
and Their Disposal (Basel Convention), pmbL & art. 1, 1993 OJ. (L 39) 1, 1 (stating
that the Council adopted Regulation 259193 EEC to "make the existing Community
system... comply with the requirements of the Basel Convention" and approving the
Convention on behalf of the Community). The Basel Convention preamble states
that the parties are
[m]indful of the growing threat to human health and the environment posed
by the increased generation ... and the transboundary movement of hazard-
ous wastes and other wastes .... [and] [c]onvinced that hazardous wastes and
other wastes should, as far as is compatible with environmentally sound and
efficient management, be disposed of in the State where they were generated
Council Decision 93/98 EEC, annex, 1993 OJ. (L 39) 3, 3.
289. Cohen, supra note 26, at 51.
290. See id. (noting the United States is a notable exception to the Basel Conven-
tion's list of contracting parties); Hunter, supra note 270, at 8 (noting that the Euro-
pean Union is a party but the United States is not as it has yet to ratify the Basel
Convention). Congress has made several attempts to implement the Basel Conven-
tion but has failed each time. See; e.g., ER. 3965, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (propos-
ing a Bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to implement the Basel
Convention); H.R. 3706, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing a Bill to prohibit the
international export and import of certain solid waste); FLR 2580, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (same); S. 1082, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing a Bill to amend
the Solid Waste Disposal Act to restrict and monitor the import and export of waste
and implement the Basel Convention).
291. Case 240/83, 1985 E.C.R. 531, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common MkL
Rep. (CCI-) 14,164 (1985).
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There is no reason to conclude that the directive has exceeded
those limits. The directive must be seen in the perspective of envi-
ronmental protection, which is one of the Community's essential
objectives.'
The Court of Justice confirmed that environmental protection is also
an imperative state interest in Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bot-
tles)2 93 where it upheld a Member State environmental protection
measure under the rule of reason.294 The court held that "protection
of the environment is 'one of the Community's essential objectives,'
which may as such justify certain limitations of the principle of the
free movement of goods .... [P]rotection of the environment is a
mandatory requirement which may limit the application of Article 30
of the Treaty. '295
C. Recognizing the Means Necessary to the Objective of
Environmental Protection
Danish Bottles represents the European Court of Justice's first anal-
ysis of a Member State environmental measure under the rule of rea-
son. Without discussing the issue of discrimination, the Court of
Justice found a Danish law requiring that all beer and soda be sold in
returnable bottles necessary to achieving a workable deposit-and-re-
turn system. In doing so, the court accepted a high level of environ-
mental protection as an imperative state interest and upheld the
means necessary to achieving that interest. The Court of Justice in
turn struck down the portion of the law requiring the containers be
approved by a government agency as disproportional to the general
interest of environmental protection. 96
The second environmental protection case to come before the
Court of Justice was Commission v. Belgium (Walloon Waste). 29 In
Walloon Waste, the court considered for the first time restrictions on
the movement of waste in intracommunity commerce. The Belgian
region of Wallonia effectively prohibited all waste generated outside
Wallonia from being stored, dumped, or tipped in Walionia for the
expressed purpose of protecting the environment by preventing waste
from accumulating, encouraging recycling and recovery, and organiz-
ing local waste disposal.2 98 The Commission argued that the decree
undermined Council Directive 75/442 on waste and Council Directive
84/361 on the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste and violated
292. Waste Oils, 1985 E.C.R. at 549.
293. Case 302/86, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 619 (1988).
294. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4630. The rule of reason is explained in part
II.C.2.b.
295. Id (citing Waste Oils, 1985 E.C.R. at 549).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
297. Case C-2/90, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4431, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1992).
298. Walloon Waste, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-4433 to 1-4434.
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Article 30 of the EEC (now EC) Treaty.299 The Court of Justice found
that the directive on the movement of hazardous waste set up a com-
plete system and thus precluded a complete ban on hazardous
waste. ° The Directive on waste, however, contained only general
provisions concerning waste disposal and thus did not prevent Mem-
ber States from banning "non-hazardous" waste.30 The final question
then was whether banning non-hazardous waste violated Article 30.
As the Supreme Court did in Philadelphia, the European Court of
Justice first determined that nonreuseable waste could be considered a
"good" under Article 30:
[O]bjects which are shipped across a frontier for the purpose of
commercial transactions are subject to Article 30, whatever the na-
ture of those transactions.... It must therefore be concluded that
waste, whether recyclable or not, is to be regarded as 'goods' the
movement of which, in accordance with Article 30 of the Treaty,
must in principle not be prevented.302
The court then went on to address Wallonia's import ban. Belgium set
out an argument under the rule of reason, contending that its tempo-
rary measure guarding against the dangerous influx of waste from
neighboring countries and regions was justified on the grounds of its
imperative interest in environmental protection and human health.31
Although Advocate General Jacobs had found the decree facially dis-
criminatory and thus not entitled to analysis under the rule of rea-
son,3° the Court of Justice held that the decree was not discriminatory
because of the "differences between waste produced in different
places and ... the connection of the waste with its place of produc-
tion. '305 The proximity and self-sufficiency principles supported the
Court of Justice's reasoning because under those principles, Member
States were required to manage and dispose of their own waste. This
made out-of-state waste cumulative and therefore dangerous. 6
The Court of Justice then agreed with Belgium that a prohibition
against disposal of waste from outside Wallonia was justified under
the rule of reason by interests "relating to environmental protec-
tion. '307 The court reasoned:
[W]aste is matter of special kind. Accumulation of waste, even
before it becomes a health hazard, constitutes a danger to the envi-
ronment, regard being had in particular to the limited capacity of
each region or locality for waste reception .... [Because of] the
299. Id. at 1-4437.
300. ld. at 1-4477.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1-4478 to 1-4479.
303. Id. at 1-4478.
304. Id. at 1-4467 (opinion of Advocate General Francis Jacobs).
305. Id. at 1-4480.




abnormal large scale inflow of waste from other regions for the tip-
ping in Wallonia, there was a real danger the environment, having
regard to the limited capacity of that region.308
The Court of Justice considered that the serious environmental threats
inherent in the accumulation of waste justified a significant restriction
on trade. The proximity and self-sufficiency principles encouraged the
reduction in waste flow and self-responsibility of Wallonia's decree.
In addition, the decree was temporary. These factors indicated to the
court that Wallonia was employing the means necessary to protect the
environment. The court therefore upheld the import ban.30 9
The Court of Justice's ultimate conclusion and some of its state-
ments comport with a heightened awareness of environmental con-
cerns, of the unique nature of waste, and of the means necessary to
fulfilling the proximity and self-sufficiency principles and thus protect-
ing the environment. The court's analysis, however, should be criti-
cized for its cursory, presumptive nature. The Court of Justice did not
clearly perform the proportionality test nor support its conclusions
with sufficient evidence. Nonetheless, it properly recognized that
Member States were taking responsibility for their own waste, making
out-of-state waste more dangerous due to its cumulative effect, and
also properly noted that Wallonia was implementing and promoting
the proximity and self-sufficiency principles adopted as the best and
necessary means of protecting the environment in the Community and
the world. Thus, in the end, the Court of Justice made the right
decision.
IV. APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY MEASUREs To SAVE THE
EARTH AND ITS INHBITANTs
The several states of the United States are in a catch-22 situation.
While they are encouraged to implement comprehensive waste man-
agement schemes and to take responsibility for their own waste gener-
ation, they are also told that they cannot place any restrictions on the
free flow of waste in the process. States that attempt to efficiently
reduce and manage waste are crippled by the Supreme Court's dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated in Oregon Waste:
While [the Court] once recognized that "the collection and disposal
of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State,
regional, and local agencies," the Court today leaves States with
only two options: become a dumper and ship as much waste as pos-
sible to a less populated State, or become a dumpee, and stoically
accept waste from more densely populated States.310
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1-4481.
310. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1357(1994) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1976)).
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This does nothing to improve the environment or the disposal process
but instead exacerbates an already desperate problem.
In light of current knowledge about the risks of transport and per-
manent disposal of solid waste and about the best ways to reduce gen-
eration of and efficiently manage waste, the Supreme Court must alter
its approach to state environmental protection measures. If the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, which must operate in a federal system under a
constitution that expressly protects the free movement of goods, un-
derstands the nature of waste and the means necessary to protect the
environment to require a complete ban of out-of-state waste, so
should the Supreme Court. Applying the proper Dean Milk test and
the same rationale as the Court of Justice, the Supreme Court would
uphold the measures it has heretofore struck down. Even under the
Philadelphia test, the Court of Justice's rationale regarding the differ-
ences between in-state and out-of-state waste and the proximity prin-
ciple would lead the Supreme Court to uphold those same measures.
It is time the Court learned a lesson from the European Court of
Justice.
A. The Failure of the Court
Although the Court has been amenable to evenhanded environ-
mental laws and has given a full and fair analysis to discriminatory
environmental laws that do not effect the movement of waste, it has
systematically struck down any measure that restricts the free flow of
waste. It does not closely examine the evidence, nor defer to legisla-
tive decisions when the scientific evidence or judicial knowledge is in-
sufficient to determine what is adequate to protect the
environment.311 Instead, it stubbornly persists to find "economic pro-
tectionism" and "arbitrary discrimination" behind every state measure
in order to condemn it as per se invalid.312
1. Dumping Philadelphia
The Supreme Court's first mistake was to create an inappropriate
test for determining the limits imposed by the Commerce Clause on a
state's power to restrict interstate trade for a legitimate purpose.313
The Philadelphia Court simply applied poor reasoning. Abandoning
311. The Court in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470
(1981), stated that "it is not the function of the courts to substitute their evaluation of
legislative facts for that of the legislature." The Court has not followed this
command.
312. In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986), and Clover Leaf Creamery, 449
U.S. at 473, the Court specifically rejected the lower courts' determinations that the
measure in question was really economic protectionism instead of environmental pro-
tectionism. The Court, however, refuses to accept environmental protection as the
true purpose of state restrictions of the movement of waste.
313. See generally Stanley E. Cox, Burying Misconceptions About Trash and Com-
merce: Why It Is Tune to Dump Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 20 Cap. U. L Rev. 813
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twenty years of precedent that had appropriately implemented the al-
ready stringent "no adequate alternatives" test for discriminatory
state measures, it chose to disregard both the states' legislative pur-
poses and the possible existence of less discriminatory means in favor
of a "virtually per se rule of invalidity." '314 Unlike this analysis-barren
test, the Dean Milk "no adequate alternatives" approach3' 1 properly
focuses on the two factors most relevant to analyzing protectionism,
the ends and the means. It also recognizes those situations where dis-
crimination is the only adequate alternative for accomplishing a legiti-
mate goal. Invalidating a law solely because it employs discriminatory
means does not fulfill the primary purpose of the dormant Commerce
Clause, which is to prohibit economic protectionism while allowing
states to take reasonable measures to protect the health, safety and
environment of its citizens.
Not only did the Court apply the wrong test, it failed to recognize
the realities of waste management. Philadelphia laid out an analysis
that included two ways of avoiding per se invalidity: (1) differentiate
between the harm caused by the in-state and out-of-state item; or (2)
identify the item as a proper subject of the Court's quarantine analy-
sis. 316 The Court dismissed the idea that out-of-state waste could be
more harmful than in-state waste by asserting that the harm created
by waste "arise[s] after its disposal in landfill sites. ' 317 Because states
manage their own waste, however, out-of-state waste creates an addi-
tional burden. The extra accumulation of waste is dangerous to the
environment, human health, and human safety, making out-of-state
waste not inherently more dangerous, but rather circumstantially
more dangerous. The Court also dismissed the idea "that the very
movement of waste into or through New Jersey endangers health, or
that waste must be disposed of as soon and as close to its point of
generation as possible. ' 318 Ironically, the Court here unknowingly de-
scribed the proximity principle which pervades the international, Eu-
ropean Union, and United States policies on environmental
protection.3 19 This principle embraces the notion that the nature of
waste is such that its very movement does endanger health and lead to
less efficient and less effective waste management, thereby endanger-
ing the whole planet. The principle also incorporates the idea that
(1991) (arguing that the Commerce Clause should not compel one state to shoulder
the burden of another state's waste).
314. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
315. See supra part I.C.1.a.
316. See supra note 104-05 and accompanying text.
317. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
318. Id.
319. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text (noting congressional findings
and Executive actions that indicated U.S. adoption of the proximity and self-suffi-




waste should be disposed of as soon and as close to its point of genera-
tion as possible because this is the best way to safely manage waste
and thus protect the environment. Although the Supreme Court does
not seem to agree, waste is a noxious item both on the road and in a
landfill. Disposing of waste as close as possible to its source prevents
the dangers of moving it and also reduces waste production and un-
safe disposal by creating awareness of and responsibility for one's own
consumption. Nothing short of limiting the amount of waste that may
come in or out of a locality will adequately serve these goals. This
high level of environmental protection is what the United States
needs. Had the Court understood the true nature of waste and waste
management and recognized the proper methods of preventing envi-
ronmental degradation, it would have upheld New Jersey's ban even
under its newfound heightened scrutiny.
2. Philadelphia's Progeny
Unfortunately, the Court failed to learn the error of its ways over
the ensuing fourteen years and thus blindly followed the same ill-fated
path in its next three movement of waste cases. The Court's cursory
analysis in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill Inc. v. Michigan Department
of Natural Resources32 led to two mistakes. First, conceding that the
SWMA provision was discriminatory in effect because subdivisions of
the state could prohibit all out-of-state waste,32' the Court failed to
apply the correct standard for discriminatory measures. It cited the
Dean Milk test but applied some version of the Philadelphia test.32
Under the Dean Milk test, the Court would have examined evi-
dence of the legitimacy of the interest, the necessity of the means em-
ployed, and the availability and adequacy of less discriminatory
alternatives. Considering Michigan's legitimate goals of reducing
waste generation, ensuring safe, efficient disposal, and preventing un-
needed movement of a dangerous item, disposal close to source and
protection from frustration of that plan were the necessary means of
achieving those goals. If counties had to send their waste elsewhere
because foreign waste filled their landfills, counties would not be tak-
ing responsibility for their waste generation and waste traffic would be
320. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
321. But see id. at 358 (noting that district court and court of appeals upheld mea-
sure as evenhanded and not clearly excessive); id. at 370 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("[T]his facially neutral restriction (i.e., it applies equally to both interstate and intra-
state waste) ... is [not] the stuff of which economic protectionism is made."); Ever-
green Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1987)
(upholding a local restriction on out-of-locale waste under the Pike test); Shaun An-
derson, Comment, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural
Resources: Solid Waste Management and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 New
Eng. L. Rev. 745, 773 (1994) (asserting that the Supreme Court should have found the
Michigan measure evenhanded and applied the Pike test).
322. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 359, 366-67.
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needlessly risking health and safety along the road. Meanwhile, those
who sent their waste into the county would be shirking responsibility
for their waste and causing the needless hazards of waste transporta-
tion. Consumption would continue at its regular pace because trash
could simply be sent away. By preventing these waste management
problems, Michigan's scheme effectively protected the environment in
the least restrictive manner available and would thus pass the Dean
Milk test.
The Court not only failed to apply the Dean Milk analysis, it also
failed to properly apply the analysis it chose to implement. "A state
statute that clearly discriminates against interstate commerce is...
unconstitutional 'unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by
a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.' 32 3 Michigan was
not attempting to protect its citizens from out-of-state competition. It
was pursuing a laudable goal unrelated to economic protectionism in
the only way adequate to reduce consumption and effectively manage
waste. In reality, the measure most disadvantaged the Michigan citi-
zens who had to take responsibility and pay more for safe disposal.
Michigan citizens could no longer send their waste to cheap-land
states with cheap disposal practices. This local disadvantage provides
a sufficient check against unduly burdensome regulations 24 Even if
the above standard were only meant to rephrase the Philadelphia
analysis, the Court again failed to recognize that (1) out-of-state waste
is more harmful because it either forces the exportation of in-state
waste or accumulates in addition to in-state waste; and (2) the nature
of waste requires that it be disposed of as close to its source as possi-
ble. If the Court had recognized these truths, it could have either ana-
lyzed the measure under Dean Milk because of the valid
differentiation between in-state and out-of-state waste or upheld the
measure under Philadelphia's quarantine analysis. Instead,
[t]he Court ... penalize[d] the State of Michigan for what to all
appearances are its good-faith efforts, in turn encouraging each
State to ignore the waste problem in the hope that another will pick
up the slack. The Court's approach fails to recognize that the latter
option is one that is quite real and quite attractive for many states
- and becomes even more so when the intermediate option of solv-
ing its own problems, but only its own problems, is eliminated. 32-
The Court made the same mistakes in Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt3 26 as it did in Fort Gratiot. First, the Court should have
applied the Dean Milk rule to find that the legitimate state concerns
323. Id. at 359 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988)).
324. Id. at 370 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (contending that the Michigan statute
"rais[ed] prices for all the State's consumers, and work[ed] to the substantial disad-
vantage of other segments of the State's population").
325. Id at 373 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
326. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
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voiced by Alabama could not be adequately served by any less dis-
criminatory means. Alabama could have prohibited imports of haz-
ardous waste altogether, but instead it gave out-of-state generators
the option of paying for disposing of their waste somewhere other
than near home. Alabama's extra fee for disposal of out-of-state
waste sought to discourage the incredibly high flow of hazardous
waste into Alabama and force generators to pay for the management
of their waste and the environmental degradation their waste
caused.327 Both of these legitimate goals could be adequately served
only by an additional fee or an even more discriminatory measure.
In any event, the Court did not apply the Dean Milk analysis.
Given the purpose of the statute and the means chosen to protect the
environment, however, the Court should have recognized that Ala-
bama's regulating the flow of waste could be constitutional even
under Philadelphia. First, Alabama differentiated between in-state
and out-of-state waste not only based on the harms of excess accumu-
lation but also based on payment for its disposal.3z Alabama citizens
(including businesses) paid for disposal through tax revenue used to
monitor disposal practices, through loss of clean environment, and
through an increase in health and safety risks; meanwhile, noncitizens
dumped their waste without feeling any of these repercussions.2 9 Ad-
ditionally, Alabama's stated purpose included the factors the Phi-
ladephia Court had delineated as forming the basis for its quarantine
analysis. Alabama sought to reduce the dangerous movement of haz-
ardous waste and encourage disposal close to its source.331 The Court
should therefore have upheld the Alabama measure.
In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality,331 the Court repeated its improper analysis regarding discrim-
inatory fees and created an additional problem. Not only did the
Court again blindly follow the outcome of Philadelphia without ques-
tioning its faulty reasoning or suitably analyzing the nature of waste
and waste disposal, but the Court also failed to clearly enunciate the
standard it was applying. It merged the Dean Milk "no adequate al-
ternatives" rule with the per se rule332 but made no attempt to analyze
the legitimacy of Oregon's comprehensive waste management and
327. IL, 504 U.S. at 343.
328. Id (citing Alabama's purpose of providing for "compensatory revenue for the
costs and burdens that out-of-state waste generators impose by dumping their hazard-
ous waste in Alabama" (quoting Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So.
2d 1367, 1389 (Ala. 1991))).
329. See id. at 350-52 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
330. IL (citing Alabama's purposes of protecting "the health and safety of citizens
of Alabama from toxic substances" and reducing "the overall flow of wastes traveling
on the state's highways, which flow creates a great risk to the health and safety of the
state's citizens" (quoting Hunt v. Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1389)).
331. 114 S. CL 1345 (1994).
332. See itL at 1351.
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compensatory scheme.333 Once more the Court applied the wrong
test and misapplied the test it selected. Instead of protecting other
states from Oregon's economic protectionism,
the Court's analysis turn[ed] the Commerce Clause on its head. Or-
egon's neighbors will operate under a competitive advantage
against their Oregon counterparts as they can now produce solid
waste with reckless abandon and avoid paying concomitant state
taxes to develop new landfills and clean up retired landfill sites.3 34
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,335 on the other hand,
did not follow exactly the same pattern as the other three Philadelphia
progeny. Most notably, the majority applied the Dean Milk test to the336
Clarkstown ordinance. The majority's mistake, however, was find-
ing discriminatory effect in Clarkstown's evenhanded measure. The
ordinance treated in-state and out-of-state waste producers exactly
the same and fulfilled a contract with one person, who may or may not
have come from Clarkstown, for waste separation. 337 Even assuming,
however, that the measure discriminated in practical effect, the major-
ity still should have pointed to evidence tending to show that other
means of ensuring safe waste disposal were both available and ade-
quate rather than relying on judicial knowledge. The Court applied
the Dean Milk analysis in such a cursory manner that it never actually
analyzed the evidence of alternative means.
Justice O'Connor, in contrast, seems to have properly applied the
Pike test to the Clarkstown ordinance. The narrow purpose of the
ordinance was to finance the transfer station and its effect was to
squelch competition in its local processing market. The town failed to
prove that the local benefits from that financing scheme outweighed
the burdens on interstate commerce. 8 The ordinance, in addition,
did not require that waste be disposed in Clarkstown, only sorted in
Clarkstown. Had the town forced haulers to send their waste to one
disposal facility as a means of preventing unnecessary movement of
waste and taking responsibility for their own waste disposal, then the
local benefits would have outweighed the burden on interstate
commerce.
The Supreme Court has haphazardly waded through its waste cases
without clearly defining a standard339 and without carefully examining
the nature of waste, the essentials of waste management, or the reali-
333. See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
334. Oregon Waste, 114 S. Ct. at 1357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
335. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
336. See supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
337. See Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
338. Il at 1689-91.
339. "[U]ncertainty in application has been attributable in no small part to the lack
of any clear theoretical underpinning for judicial 'enforcement' of the Commerce
Clause." Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 651214
MANAGING INTERSTATE WASTE
ties of the disposal crisis. The Court "has failed to generate the kind
of consistent, principled decisionmaking that is essential to the orderly
development of constitutional law."'3 0  The Court has no clear
method for determining what is and what is not discriminatory.3 1
Moreover when the Court finds a measure discriminatory on its face
or in practical effect, it has no clear standard under which to analyze
the measure. In the context of the movement of wastes, the Court has
applied the Philadelphia per se invalidity rule,3 2 a hybrid of that rule
and the Dean Milk "no adequate alternatives" rule,343 and the Dean
Milk rule incorrectly defined as the per se invalidity rule.'
The Dean Milk test best advances the goals of the dormant Com-
merce Clause and the Court should thus utilize it when faced with
discriminatory state measures.34s When the Court uses this test, it
should demand to hear evidence on the adequacy of all alternatives
and should defer to state legislatures if the data is inconclusive. State
legislatures make policy decisions regarding the means necessary to
protect human health and the environment and the Supreme Court
overrides these decisions without any information as to what schemes
would or would not effectively reduce waste production or manage
waste. The Court should not be replacing legislative findings and pol-
icy decisions with its own. The Court should also recognize that the
highest level of environmental protection can only be achieved by re-
ducing consumption, taking responsibility for one's own waste genera-
tion, and decreasing the amount of waste in transit. These goals in
turn require that states manage their own waste and only their own
waste.
The Supreme Court will not soon overturn its recent precedents on
the free movement of waste and may use the Philadelphia analysis
again. In that case, the Court should analyze more carefully the na-
ture of waste. If the Court appreciated the noxious nature of waste
and the resultant need for comprehensive waste management plans, it
340. Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much - An Eramination of Com-
merce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 47, 89 (1981).
341. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986) ("[T]here is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is
virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause and the category subject to the
Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach.").
342. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see also Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359
(1992) (stating that "Philadelphia v. New Jersey provides the framework for our analy-
sis of this case").
343. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345,
1350 (1994); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344-46 (1992).
344. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994).
345. See supra part IV.A.1 (arguing that the Dean Milk analysis is far more appro-
priate than the Philadelphia analysis).
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could uphold measures that restrict the free flow of waste even under
Philadelphia.346
The European Court of Justice has followed the route suggested by
this Note and accordingly has upheld a complete ban on out-of-region
waste. This part continues by analyzing the regulations imposed in
United States waste disposal cases in light of the Court of Justice's
jurisprudence.
B. The Movement of Waste Enlightened by the Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice has examined the conflict between
the free movement of goods and environmental protection in the form
of efficient and safe waste management in Walloon Waste. 47 Walloon
Waste reveals the Court of Justice's understanding of the unique char-
acteristics of waste as a product and of the need to employ the prox-
imity and self-sufficiency principles to achieve a high level of
environmental protection. Applying the Court of Justice's under-
standing and reasoning to the measures reviewed in the United States
movement of waste cases would thus produce very different outcomes
in four of those cases.
1. City of Philadephia v. New Jersey
New Jersey's complete ban of out-of-state waste came in response
to dwindling landfill capacity. In order to plan for the disposal of its
own waste and minimize residents' and the environment's exposure to
solid waste, New Jersey passed the Waste Control Act. This act pro-
hibited the incineration or landfill in New Jersey facilities of waste
generated or collected outside the state. as New Jersey's plight and
response almost exactly coincide with Wallonia's.34 If the statute
were analyzed with the Court of Justice's insight, it would be upheld
under either the Dean Milk or Philadelphia test.
The New Jersey statute was facially discriminatory and therefore
should have been scrutinized under the Dean Milk test which parallels
the Court of Justice's proportionality test. The first question then be-
comes whether New Jersey's local interest in protecting its environ-
ment and the health and safety of its citizens was both legitimate and
the true interest. Environmental protection was a legitimate local in-
terest and New Jersey was clearly attempting to protect the environ-
ment not, implement a "disguised restriction on trade. 35 0 The
legislature based its findings as to the shrinking landfill space and the
346. See supra part IV.B (applying the Court of Justice's reasoning to Philadelphia
and its progeny under both the Dean Milk and Philadelphia tests).
347. Case C-2/90, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4431, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1992).
348. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Conn'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
348 A.2d 505, 508 (NJ. 1975).
349. See supra part III.C.
350. See EC Treaty art. 36.
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threat to the quality of New Jersey's environment caused by out-of-
state waste on data collected over five years.3"'
The second question is whether adequate nondiscriminatory alter-
natives to the complete ban of out-of-state waste existed. According
to the Court of Justice, the accumulation of out-of-state waste, espe-
cially in a state with overburdened landfills, creates a serious danger
to health and environment that justifies a serious restriction on the
free movement of goods. Considering particularly that the Commu-
nity and the world consider point source management and self-suffi-
ciency to be the best means of reducing waste generation and
efficiently managing waste, a measure that implements these princi-
ples would be upheld as necessary to the protection of the environ-
ment. 2 Applying the Court of Justice's reasoning to the New Jersey
statute, which implemented those principles, would accordingly result
in the statute's being upheld under a Dean Milk analysis.
If the statute were analyzed under Philadelphia, the first inquiry
would be whether out-of-state waste could be distinguished from in-
state waste. The Court of Justice recognizes that waste's cumulative
effect makes out-of-state waste more dangerous and harmful than in-
state waste.353 Having distinguished in-state and out-of-state waste,
the Supreme Court's analysis would then require an examination of
the existence of adequate alternatives as in Maine v. Taylor.35 As
noted in the preceding paragraph, the statute would survive the Dean
Milk "no adequate alternatives" test. A separate exception to Phila-
delphia's per se invalidity rule arises if waste can be characterized as
an item that by its movement creates danger and by its nature should
be disposed of at its source.355 The Court of Justice clearly character-
ized waste in this way when it adopted the proximity principle which
embodies the conclusions that waste should be moved as little as pos-
sible and should be safely disposed of as close to its source as possi-
ble.356 The Court of Justice's approach would therefore save New
Jersey's statute under either the Dean Milk or the Philadelphia test.
2. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of
Natural Resources
Michigan enacted a comprehensive waste management plan that re-
quired local regions to manage their own waste over twenty years. Its
purpose was to use point source management as a means of reducing
waste generation and safely disposing of waste. Part of the plan in-
cluded banning out-of-region waste if the receiving county could not
351. Hackensack, 348 A.2d at 507, 509-10.
352. See supra part III.C.
353. See id.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 111-19.
355. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
356. See supra part III.C.
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handle the influx. 7 This provision has the same purpose and effect
on commerce as the Wallonian provision. Although the Michigan and
Wallonian measures could be considered evenhanded because each
equally prohibits intrastate and interstate waste from being disposed
of in the region, neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Justice
found them evenhanded for that reason. The Supreme Court found
the Michigan measure discriminatory whereas the Court of Justice
found the Wallonian measure nondiscriminatory by differentiating in-
state from out-of-state waste. 8 Under Supreme Court doctrine, dif-
ferentiating in-state and out-of-state goods would justify not the Pike
test for evenhanded measures, but rather a reprieve from the per se
invalidity test and an application of the Dean Milk test.35 9
Assuming then that the Dean Milk rule applies, the Court of Justice
would consider Michigan's regional ban necessary to attain the goal of
environmental protection just as it considered Wallonia's regional ban
necessary. The Michigan measure particularly implements the prox-
imity and self-sufficiency goals that the Court of Justice has deemed
necessary components in an efficient waste management scheme. The
Michigan provision would therefore be upheld under the Court of Jus-
tice's rationale. If the Philadelphia analysis enlightened by the Court
of Justice's insight applies, the Michigan provision would receive an
analysis identical to that of the New Jersey statute360 and would thus
also be upheld under Philadelphia.
3. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt and Oregon Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality
As part of comprehensive waste management plans, both Alabama
and Oregon imposed discriminatory fees on disposal within their bor-
ders of waste generated outside their borders. Alabama insisted that
the additional fee for out-of-state waste served the purposes of pro-
tecting human health and safety from excess waste, conserving the en-
vironment, providing compensatory revenue for dumping in Alabama,
and reducing the risk created by waste traveling on the state's high-
ways.361 Oregon's purpose was also to recoup revenue for disposing
of waste generated by those who did not pay taxes in Oregon and to
reduce the flow of waste into Oregon generally.362 At least some of
357. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1992).
358. See supra part III.C.
359. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (distinguishing Philadelphia
by distinguishing in-state from out-of-state crayfish and then applying the Dean Milk
"no adequate alternatives" test to the discriminatory statute in question).
360. See supra part IV.B.1.
361. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 343 (1992).




these purposes comport with the proximity and self-sufficiency
principles.
Both the Alabama and Oregon measures are facially discriminatory
under Supreme Court doctrine. Applying the Dean Milk test and the
Court of Justice's rationale, the measures would be upheld as neces-
sary to environmental protection because they reduce the movement
of waste and force generators to take responsibility for their own
waste, thereby preventing the dangers of movement and reducing con-
sumption. The only alternative that would effectively reduce the flow
of waste generally and protect the states' citizens from the accumula-
tion of waste would be banning out-of-state waste completely, which is
more discriminatory than an additional fee. Alabama's and Oregon's
waste management schemes would thus be upheld under Dean Milk.
The Philadelphia analysis, coupled with the Court of Justice's views on
the differences between in-state and out-of-state waste and the neces-
sity of disposing of waste as close to its source as possible, mimics the
analysis of the New Jersey, Michigan, and Wallonian measures. Be-
cause Alabama and Oregon implemented the proximity and self-suffi-
ciency principles in their waste management schemes, those schemes
would also be upheld under a Court of Justice-enlightened Philadel-
phia test.
4. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown
The Clarkstown flow control ordinance required all solid waste in
the town to be sorted at the designated transfer station before leaving
the municipality.363 The narrow purpose of the ordinance was to fi-
nance the transfer station by guaranteeing a minimum waste flow and
allowing the contractor to charge a per ton tipping fee. The broader
purpose was to efficiently manage waste by building and maintaining a
state-of-the-art waste transfer facility. 3 " Because the ordinance did
nothing to ensure that disposal would occur as close to the source of
the waste as possible, it did not fulfill the proximity or self-sufficiency
principles.
The discrimination found in this ordinance was against out-of-state
waste processors. Under the Dean Milk test or the Court of Justice's
proportionality test, this ordinance might fail simply because financing
a local business is generally not a legitimate state purpose. Even if the
court accepted the environmental goal, however, it probably would
not consider forcing all waste to be separated at one facility necessary
to protect the environment. The ordinance does not prevent the ac-
cumulation of waste, reduce movement of waste, nor take ultimate
responsibility for disposing of the waste. Evidence would most likely
show that less restrictive alternatives for separating recyclable from
363. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1680 (1994).
364. IdL at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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nonrecyclable items would be adequate to achieve efficient waste
management. Under the Philadelphia analysis, the ordinance would
fail because even the Court of Justice most likely would not find a
reason to distinguish between in-state and out-of-state processors.
Furthermore, the nature of waste is not at issue in this case.
Had the ordinance prohibited exports of waste for disposal and sent
all waste to one landfill in an effort to efficiently handle waste dispo-
sal, it would have implemented the proximity and self-sufficiency prin-
ciples necessary for protection of the environment. In that case, the
Court of Justice's analysis would have led it to be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Before we know it, the United States will be buried in garbage.
With each movement of waste case it reviews, "[t]he Court... further
limits the dwindling options available to States as they contend with
the environmental, health, safety, and political challenges posed by
the problem of solid waste disposal in modem society. 3 65 The nature
of waste, the need for comprehensive waste management plans for the
future, and the crisis situation facing the nation, all counsel a new ap-
proach to the flow of waste across the country. The Supreme Court
need only look across the Atlantic to the European Court of Justice
for a lesson in how to balance free trade and the environment. As the
New Transatlantic Agenda states:
We, the United States of America and the European Union, affirm
our conviction that the ties which bind our people are as strong to-
day as they have been for the past half century. For over fifty years,
the transatlantic partnership has been the leading force for peace
and prosperity for ourselves and for the world.... Today we face
new challenges at home and abroad.... [W]e can learn from each
other's experiences and build new transatlantic bridges. 366
Hopefully the Supreme Court will build a transatlantic bridge to the
European Court of Justice and adopt its approach to saving the world
from the free flow of waste.
365. Oregon Waste, 114 S. Ct. at 1359 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
366. Joint European Union-U.S. "New Trans-Atlantic Agenda" and Action Plan
Signed by President Clinton and EU Officials at Madrid Summit Dec. 3, 1995, 1995
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 234, doc. 88 (Dec. 6, 1995), available in
Westlaw, BNA-DER database.
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